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CLEARLY ERRONEOUS: THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 
MARYLAND’S MISGUIDED SHIFT TO A HIGHER STANDARD 
FOR POST-CONVICTION DNA RELIEF 
CHRISTINE E. WHITE∗
The State of Maryland has a fascinating connection to the devel-
opment of post-conviction DNA testing, a connection that demon-
strates the need for such testing not only to determine the true perpe-
trators of serious crimes but also to exonerate the wrongfully 
convicted.
 
1  Kirk Noble Bloodsworth “has the fortunate, yet sorrowful, 
distinction of being the first individual in the United States to be ex-
onerated of a crime that placed him on death row.”2  Convicted of 
rape and murder in 1985 in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County 
and sentenced to death,3
 
Copyright © 2012 by Christine E. White. 
 Mr. Bloodsworth was released from prison 
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reading the piece. 
 1. See Dist. Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 129 S. Ct. 
2308, 2312 (2009) (“DNA testing has an unparalleled ability both to exonerate the wrongly 
convicted and to identify the guilty.”); cf. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, 
J., concurring) (arguing that “a fundamental value determination of our society [is] that it 
is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free”). 
 2. John T. Rago, “Truth or Consequences” and Post-Conviction DNA Testing: Have You 
Reached Your Verdict?, 107 DICK. L. REV. 845, 848 n.12 (2003).  For an in-depth discussion of 
Mr. Bloodsworth’s case, see id. at 857–68. 
 3. A jury convicted Mr. Bloodsworth of first degree rape and murder in the death of 
nine-year-old Dawn Hamilton.  Bloodsworth v. State, 307 Md. 164, 166–67, 173, 512 A.2d 
1056, 1057, 1060 (1986).  The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed the conviction based 
on a finding that Mr. Bloodsworth’s Brady rights were violated, but in remanding the case 
for a new trial, the court held that the evidence presented at trial was more than sufficient 
to justify Mr. Bloodsworth’s conviction.  The court recited the facts used to convict Mr. 
Bloodsworth, which included five eyewitness identifications, and concluded that “a ration-
al trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] committed the 
crimes.”  Id. at 171–76, 187, 512 A.2d at 1059–61, 1067.  After the new trial, a jury con-
victed Mr. Bloodsworth of the same crimes, and he received two life sentences.  Bloods-
worth v. State, 76 Md. App. 23, 26, 543 A.2d 382, 384 (1988).  On appeal, the Maryland 
Court of Special Appeals held that a rational fact finder could have found Mr. Bloods-
worth guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 33, 543 A.2d at 387.  The Court of Appeals 
denied a petition for certiorari.  Bloodsworth v. State, 313 Md. 688, 548 A.2d 128 (1988).  
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in 1993 after DNA testing revealed that he could not have committed 
the crimes.4  In the years after Mr. Bloodsworth’s release, “Maryland 
adopted one of the nation’s most far-reaching rules for reopening old 
criminal cases and giving inmates convicted of murder and rape an 
opportunity to prove their innocence based on DNA evidence.”5
The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted relief to petitioners in 
nine of the eleven post-conviction DNA testing cases that have come 
before it.
   
6  In the process, the court developed a petitioner-friendly 
approach toward reviewing requests for DNA testing.7  The court’s 
decision in Blake v. State (“Blake II”),8 however, stands in stark contrast 
to this petitioner-friendly line of decisions and signals a troubling turn 
in the court’s post-conviction DNA testing jurisprudence.  In Blake II, 
the Court of Appeals addressed whether a State search for potentially 
exculpatory DNA evidence met the reasonableness required by Mary-
land’s post-conviction DNA testing statute.9  In finding that the search 
was reasonable, the court affirmed the post-conviction trial court’s 
denial of Mr. Blake’s request for additional searches.10
 
For a discussion of Mr. Bloodsworth’s case in the context of expert testimony on eyewit-
ness identification in Maryland, see Derek Simmonsen, Comment, Teach Your Jurors Well: 
Using Jury Instructions to Educate Jurors About Factors Affecting the Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimo-
ny, 70 MD. L. REV. 1044, 1044–46 (2011). 
  The great 
concern with Blake II, notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Blake will 
most likely spend the remainder of his life in prison, is how the Court 
of Appeals reached its decision.  Namely, the court announced that 
“[t]he ‘clearly erroneous’ standard of review is applicable to” a trial 
 4. Rago, supra note 2, at 867.  Polymerase chain reaction (“PCR”) testing, “the most 
advanced type of DNA fingerprinting then known,” of a semen sample from the victim’s 
underwear “definitively excluded Kirk Bloodsworth as the donor of the sperm.”  TIM 
JUNKIN, BLOODSWORTH: THE TRUE STORY OF THE FIRST DEATH ROW INMATE EXONERATED 
BY DNA 245, 255 (2004).   
 5. Dan Rodricks, Long Wait for Justice with DNA Testing, BALT. SUN, Sept. 12, 2010, at 
25A.   
 6. See infra Parts I.C, II.B.  This Comment will discuss the following cases: Washington 
v. State, 424 Md. 632, 37 A.3d 932 (2012); Arey v. State, 422 Md. 328, 29 A.3d 986 (2011) 
[hereinafter Arey II]; Blake v. State, 418 Md. 445, 15 A.3d 787 (2011) [hereinafter Blake II]; 
Horton v. State, 412 Md. 1, 985 A.2d 540 (2009); Thompson v. State, 411 Md. 664, 985 
A.2d 32 (2009) [hereinafter Thompson II]; Arrington v. State, 411 Md. 524, 983 A.2d 1071 
(2009); Simms v. State, 409 Md. 722, 976 A.2d 1012 (2009); Gregg v. State, 409 Md. 698, 
976 A.2d 999 (2009); Arey v. State, 400 Md. 491, 929 A.2d 501 (2007) [hereinafter Arey I]; 
Thompson v. State, 395 Md. 240, 909 A.2d 1035 (2006) [hereinafter Thompson I]; Blake v. 
State, 395 Md. 213, 909 A.2d 1020 (2006) [hereinafter Blake I].   
 7. See infra Part II.B.   
 8. 418 Md. 445, 15 A.3d 787 (2011). 
 9. Id. at 460, 15 A.3d at 796; see also MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201 (LexisNexis 
Supp. 2011) [hereinafter § 8-201 (2009)] (effective Jan. 1, 2009) (“DNA evidence—
Postconviction review”). 
 10. Blake II, 418 Md. at 451–52, 15 A.3d at 791. 
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court’s decision that the State conducted a reasonable search for 
DNA evidence, as required by Section 8-201.11  The court affirmed 
that this was the appropriate standard eleven months later, in Febru-
ary 2012, in Washington v. State.12
This Comment will demonstrate that the decision of the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland to apply a “clearly erroneous” standard of review 
to a trial court’s determination that the State conducted a reasonable 
search for potentially exculpatory DNA is problematic for three rea-
sons.  First, a clearly erroneous standard is inconsistent with the intent 
of the Maryland General Assembly in enacting Section 8-201, the 
state’s post-conviction DNA testing statute.
 
13  Second, in applying this 
standard, the Court of Appeals departed from its prior course of peti-
tioner-friendly Section 8-201 decisions and jeopardized the potential 
for relief in future cases.14  Finally, a clearly erroneous standard of re-
view fails to appreciate the significance of the issues presented by 
post-conviction DNA testing cases.15  The Court of Appeals should 
have adopted a heightened standard to review appeals from a post-
conviction trial court’s finding that the State’s search for DNA evi-
dence was reasonable.  The more exacting standards adopted by the 
high courts of other states, particularly the bifurcated standard of re-
view implemented in Texas, provide examples of how the Court of 
Appeals could have provided petitioners with relief through post-
conviction DNA testing, while also according deference to the deci-
sions of post-conviction trial courts.16
I.  BACKGROUND 
  By adopting the clearly errone-
ous standard, however, the Court of Appeals effectively foreclosed any 
possibility of meaningful relief for many petitioners. 
The capabilities of DNA technology have advanced significantly 
since the advent of DNA testing in criminal cases, resulting in exten-
sive attention to the role of DNA testing in post-conviction proceed-
ings throughout the United States.17  Maryland is among forty-nine 
states that have adopted DNA testing statutes to provide petitioners 
with greater post-conviction remedies.18
 
 11. Id. at 460, 15 A.3d at 796. 
  Expanding on the path 
 12. 424 Md. 632, 37 A.3d 932, 943 (2012). 
 13. See infra Part II.A. 
 14. See infra Part II.B. 
 15. See infra Part II.C.  
 16. See infra Part II.D.   
 17. See infra Part I.A. 
 18. See infra notes 31–35 and accompanying text. 
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forged by the Maryland General Assembly, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland has developed a body of case law that demonstrates a com-
mitment to increasing access to post-conviction DNA testing.19  The 
court’s decision in Blake II, however, to apply a clearly erroneous 
standard of review to determinations of the reasonableness of a search 
for DNA evidence represents a change of course.20
A.  The Role of DNA Testing in Post-Conviction Proceedings  
   
Modern DNA testing was first used in criminal cases in the Unit-
ed States in the mid-1980s.21  Since then, “there have been several ma-
jor advances in DNA technology, culminating in STR technology.”22  
Short tandem repeat (“STR”) testing “‘is the most commonly used 
DNA testing in the criminal justice system.’”23  It has “exponentially 
[increased] the reliability of forensic identification over earlier tech-
niques[, and t]here is now widespread agreement within the scientific 
community that this technology, which requires literally cellular-size 
samples only, can distinguish between any two individuals on the pla-
net.”24  As a result of these technological advances in DNA testing 
technology, forensic analysts can now determine with almost “near 
certainty” whether a suspect is a match for a particular DNA sample.25
The powerful capabilities of DNA testing have become increa-
singly important in the context of post-conviction proceedings.  In 
District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne, the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, ruled that under the U.S. 
Constitution there is no substantive due process right to testing of 
DNA evidence.
    
26
 
 19. See infra Part I.C.1–2.  
  The Court held that the task of determining “how to 
harness DNA’s power to prove innocence without unnecessarily 
overthrowing the established system of criminal justice[] . . . belongs 
 20. See infra Part I.C.3. 
 21. Dist. Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 129 S. Ct. 
2308, 2316 (2009). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Gregg v. State, 409 Md. 698, 720–21 n.10, 976 A.2d 999, 1012 n.10 (2009) (quoting 
Catherine Arcabascio, Chimeras: Double the DNA—Double the Fun for Crime Scene Investigators, 
Prosecutors, and Defense Attorneys?, 40 AKRON L. REV. 435, 449 (2007)). 
 24. Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 305 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., concurring in the 
judgment); see id. at 305 n.1 (providing a detailed discussion of the capabilities of short 
tandem repeat DNA testing).  But see United States v. Bentham, 414 F. Supp. 2d 472, 473 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (acknowledging the fallibility of different types of forensic science, includ-
ing DNA testing). 
 25. 557 U.S. 52, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2312, 2316 (2009). 
 26. Id. at 2312, 2316.     
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primarily to the legislature.”27  Notwithstanding the absence of a fed-
eral constitutional guarantee, Congress passed the Innocence Protec-
tion Act of 2004,28 which gives federal prisoners “under a sentence of 
imprisonment or death pursuant to a conviction for a Federal of-
fense” the opportunity to petition for post-conviction DNA testing.29  
The Innocence Protection Act also established the Kirk Bloodsworth 
Post-Conviction DNA Testing Grant Program, which “award[s] grants 
to States to help defray the costs of post-conviction DNA testing.”30
On the state level, all fifty states and the District of Columbia 
provide some form of relief to petitioners who seek exoneration 
through post-conviction DNA testing.  Forty-nine states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia have passed statutes that provide access to such test-
ing.
   
31
 
 27. Id. at 2316. 
  Oklahoma, the only state that does not have a statute providing 
 28. Pub. L. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2279 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3600 (2006)). 
 29. 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a).  Under the Innocence Protection Act, a petitioner can gain 
access to DNA testing of evidence if the court that handed down the judgment finds that 
certain statutorily mandated conditions are satisfied.  Id. 
 30. Pub. L. 108–405, 118 Stat. 2284 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14136e (2004)).  For a dis-
cussion of Mr. Bloodsworth’s conviction for rape and murder and his eventual exonera-
tion in Maryland, see supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text.   
 31. ALA. CODE § 15-18-200 (LexisNexis 2011); ALASKA STAT. § 12.73.010 (2010); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4240 (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-112-201 to -202, -208 (2006); CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 1405 (West 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-1-411 to -416 (West 2004); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 54-102jj to -102kk (West 2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4504 
(2007); D.C. CODE §§ 22-4131, -4133 to -4135 (Supp. 2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 925.11–.12 
(West Supp. 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 5-5-41 (Supp. 2011); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 844D-
121 to -133 (LexisNexis 2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 19-4901 to -4911 (2004 & Supp. 2011); 
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-3 (West 2008); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-38-7-1 to -38-7-19 
(LexisNexis Supp. 2011); IOWA CODE ANN. § 81.10 (West 2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2512 
(2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 422.285, .287 (West 2006 & Supp. 2011); LA. CODE CRIM. 
PROC. ANN. art. 926.1 (2008 & Supp. 2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2136–2138 
(2003 & Supp. 2011); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-210 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 278A (2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 770.16 (West 2006 & Supp. 
2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 590.01–.10 (West 2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-39-5 (Supp. 
2011); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 547.035, .037 (West 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-21-110 (2011); 
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-4116 to -4125 (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 176.0918–.0919 (Lex-
isNexis 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 651-D:1 to :5 (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2011); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32a (West 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-1A-2 (LexisNexis 2009); N.Y. 
CRIM. PROC. LAW  §§ 440.10–.30 (McKinney 2005 & Supp. 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-
269 to -270.1 (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 29-32.1-15 (West 2006); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. §§ 2953.71–.84 (LexisNexis 2010); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 138.690–.698 (2011); 42 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9543.1 (West 2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-9.1-10 to -9.1-12 (Supp. 
2006); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-28-10 to -28-120 (Supp. 2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 23-5B-1 
to -17 (Supp. 2011); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-30-301 to -313 (2006); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. 
ANN. art. 64.01–.05 (West 2006 & Supp. 2011); UTAH CODE. ANN. §§ 78B-9-300 to -304 
(LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 5561–5570 (2009); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 19.2-327.1 (2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.73.170 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); W. 
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for access to post-conviction DNA testing,32 does have judicially 
crafted procedures that provide petitioners with comparable relief.33  
The first state to adopt a post-conviction DNA testing statute was New 
York, in 1994.34  The Maryland General Assembly followed suit with 
Section 8-201 in 2001 and has amended the statute several times since 
its enactment.35  Like the General Assembly, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland, until recently, was attuned to the importance of exonera-
tive post-conviction DNA testing and had developed a comprehensive 
body of case law addressing the various issues that arise in the context 
of Section 8-201 petitions.36
B.  Procedural Requirements for Access to Post-Conviction DNA Testing 
in Maryland 
 
The Maryland General Assembly adopted Section 8-201 “in line 
with a nationwide trend . . . to provide an avenue for the exoneration 
of the actually innocent.”37
 
VA. CODE ANN. § 15-2B-14 (LexisNexis 2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 974.07 (West 2007 & Supp. 
2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-12-302 to -12-315 (2011). 
  The current version of Section 8-201 al-
Massachusetts is the most recent state to enact a post-conviction DNA testing statute.  
On February 9, 2012, Senate Bill 1987, “An Act Providing Access to Forensic and Scientific 
Analysis,” was presented to the governor after being passed by the Senate and the House 
on August 1, 2011, and February 8, 2012, respectively.  S.B. 1987, 187th Gen. Court (Mass. 
2011).  The governor signed the statute on February 17, 2012.  Post Conviction Access to 
Forensic and Scientific Analysis, ch. 38 Acts of 2012 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 278A 
(2012)).     
 32. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1371(B) (West 2003) (explaining that “the Oklaho-
ma Indigent Defense System DNA Forensic Testing Program continue[d] until July 1, 
2005” but was not renewed).   
 33. For example, “Curtis Edward McCarty was exonerated in 2007 [after the expiration 
of Oklahoma’s DNA access statute] after serving 21 years—including 19 years on death 
row—for a 1982 Oklahoma City murder he didn’t commit.”  Know the Cases: Curtis McCarty, 
INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Curtis_McCarty.php 
(last visited Mar. 13, 2012).  In addition, Robert Lee Miller, Jr., was exonerated of two rape 
and murder convictions in 1998, two years before Oklahoma’s DNA statute went into ef-
fect.  Know the Cases: Robert Miller, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ 
Content/Robert_Miller.php (last visited Mar. 13, 2012);  see also Lott v. State, 98 P.3d 318, 
359–60 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004) (stating that the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and 
remanded the conviction of Miller, Lott’s co-defendant, because of new DNA evidence). 
 34. Blake I, 395 Md. 213, 219, 909 A.2d 1020, 1023 (2006); see N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 
440.30(1-a)(a) (“Where the defendant's motion [to vacate a judgment and set aside a sen-
tence] requests the performance of a forensic DNA test on specified evidence, . . . the 
court shall grant the application . . . upon its determination that if a DNA test had been 
conducted on such evidence, and if the results had been admitted in the trial resulting in 
the judgment, there exists a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been more 
favorable to the defendant.”). 
 35. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 36. See infra Part I.C. 
 37. Blake I, 395 Md. at 219, 909 A.2d at 1023. 
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lows petitioners to access “DNA testing [that] has the scientific poten-
tial to produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence relevant to a claim 
of wrongful conviction or sentencing.”38 The General Assembly has 
amended Section 8-201 several times to expand petitioners’ access to 
post-conviction DNA testing.39  One of the ways that the General As-
sembly sought to achieve this goal is through the appellate procedure 
that provides for a direct appeal to the Court of Appeals of Maryland, 
a remedy that is only authorized in a limited number of circums-
tances.40
1.  Statutory Framework of Section 8-201 
 
Section 8-201 originally took effect in 2001.41  Maryland was one 
of seventeen states to pass a post-conviction DNA access statute that 
year.42  Under Section 8-201, an individual who has been convicted of 
certain crimes, including murder, rape, manslaughter, or a sexual of-
fense in the first or second degree, may file a petition requesting DNA 
analysis of evidence in the State’s possession or requesting a search 
“for the purpose of identifying the source of physical evidence used 
for DNA testing.”43
The Court of Appeals has held that Section 8-201 is a remedial 
statute because “its purpose is to provide a remedy for persons con-
victed of serious crimes of which they are actually innocent.”
   
44  Thus, 
the court has ruled that amendments to Section 8-201 apply retroac-
tively.45  The General Assembly has amended Section 8-201 four times 
since 2001.46
 
 38. § 8-201(d)(1)(i) (2009). 
  The most significant amendments occurred in 2003 and 
2008.  In 2003, the General Assembly amended the provision of Sec-
 39. See infra Part I.B.1.  
 40. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 41. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201 (LexisNexis 2001) [hereinafter § 8-201 
(2001)]; Blake I, 395 Md. at 219, 909 A.2d at 1023.  
 42. Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2002) (Wilkinson, J., concurring in 
the judgment).   
 43. § 8-201(b) (2009).  The statute covers murder and rape in the second degree.  Id.   
 44. Gregg v. State, 409 Md. 698, 715, 976 A.2d 999, 1009 (2009). 
 45. Id. at 715–16, 976 A.2d at 1008–09 (“Legislative enactments that have remedial ef-
fect and do not impair vested rights also are given retrospective application.” (citing 
Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 408, 754 A.2d 389, 395 (2000))); see also Thompson II, 411 
Md. 664, 680, 985 A.2d 32, 41 (2009) (“[T]he expanded right of appeal accorded by the 
2008 statute should be applied retroactively.”); Arrington v. State, 411 Md. 524, 542, 983 
A.2d 1071, 1081 (2009) (“[T]he common law presumption against retroactive application 
of statutes” does not apply to remedial statutes.).   
 46. Gregg, 409 Md. at 708 & n.5, 976 A.2d at 1004 & n.5. 
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tion 8-201 relating to court orders for DNA testing.47  These amend-
ments, which took effect October 1, 2003, “relaxed the standard the 
petitioner must meet to establish entitlement to testing.”48  Whereas 
the version of Section 8-201 in effect prior to the 2003 amendments 
required a court to make six findings before granting a petitioner’s 
request for DNA testing,49 the 2003 amendments limited the required 
findings to two.  A court must grant a petitioner’s Section 8-201 re-
quest “if the court finds that: (1) a reasonable probability exists that 
the DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce exculpatory or 
mitigating evidence relevant to a claim of wrongful conviction or sen-
tencing; and (2) the requested DNA test employs a method of testing 
generally accepted within the relevant scientific community.”50
The current version of Section 8-201 no longer requires a peti-
tioner to establish that the evidence in question “was not previously 
subjected to the DNA testing that is requested” or that the requested 
testing is different from previously conducted tests.
  
51  Furthermore, a 
petitioner no longer needs to establish that there is a “reasonable 
probability” that the results of DNA testing could be “materially relevant 
to [an] assertion of innocence.”52
 
 47. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201 (LexisNexis Supp. 2003) [hereinafter § 8-201 
(2003)] (effective Oct. 1, 2003).    
  Instead, the “reasonable probability” 
 48. Gregg, 409 Md. at 711, 714, 976 A.2d at 1006, 1008.   
 49. The pre-2003 version of the court order provision stated:  
[A] court shall order DNA testing if the court finds that: (1)(i) the scientific 
identification evidence was not previously subjected to the DNA testing that is 
requested for reasons beyond the control of the petitioner; or (ii) the type of 
DNA test being requested is different from tests previously conducted and would 
have a reasonable likelihood of providing a more probative result than tests pre-
viously conducted; (2) the scientific identification evidence was secured as pro-
vided in subsection (i) of this section, in relation to the crime for which the peti-
tioner was convicted; (3) the scientific identification evidence to be tested has 
been subject to a chain of custody as provided under subsection (i) of this sec-
tion that is sufficient to establish that it has not been substituted, tampered with, 
replaced, or altered in any material aspect; (4) identity was an issue in the trial 
that resulted in the petitioner’s conviction; (5) a reasonable probability exists 
that the DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce results materially re-
levant to the petitioner's assertion of innocence; and (6) the requested DNA test 
employs a method of testing generally accepted within the relevant scientific 
community.  
§ 8-201(c) (2001). 
 50. § 8-201(c) (2003).  The Gregg court noted that “as of January 1, 2009, what was sub-
section (c) has been re-lettered.”  Gregg, 409 Md. at 712, 976 A.2d at 1007.  The 2008 
“amendments made no change to the wording of what was subsection (c), but other 
changes to the statute prompted its re-lettering as subsection (d).”  Simms v. State, 409 
Md. 722, 728 n.6, 976 A.2d 1012, 1016 n.6 (2009). 
 51. Compare § 8-201(d) (2009), with § 8-201(c)(1)(i) (2001).   
 52. § 8-201(c)(5) (2001) (emphasis added). 
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now required is that the DNA testing could “produce exculpatory or 
mitigating evidence relevant to a claim of wrongful conviction or sentenc-
ing.”53
The 2008 amendments took effect January 1, 2009, and will re-
main in effect through December 31, 2013.
 
54  Through the 2008 
amendments, the General Assembly afforded petitioners the oppor-
tunity for a new trial when (1) the DNA testing produces a result that 
is favorable to the petitioner and (2) there is a substantial possibility 
“that the petitioner would not have been convicted if the DNA testing 
results had been known or introduced at trial.”55  Even if there is no 
such possibility, a “court may order a new trial if the court determines 
that the action is in the interest of justice.”56  The 2008 amendments 
also expanded the State’s duty to preserve scientific evidence under 
Section 8-201.57  If the State cannot produce the requested DNA evi-
dence, the petitioner is entitled to a hearing so that the trial court can 
“determine whether the failure to produce evidence was the result of 
intentional and willful destruction.”58  Thus, the current version of 
Section 8-201, implemented by the 2008 amendments and in effect 
from 2009 through 2013, provides petitioners with more relief than 
was previously available or than will be available beginning in 2014.59
 
 53. § 8-201(d)(1)(i) (2009) (emphasis added); see also Gregg, 409 Md. at 708–12, 976 
A.2d at 1004–07 (discussing the differences between the version of Section 8-201 in effect 
prior to the 2003 amendments and the current version of the statute).  
 
 54. § 8-201 (2009).  On January 1, 2014, Section 8-201 reverts back to the version that 
was in effect before the 2008 amendments took effect.  MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-
201 (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2011) [hereinafter § 8-201 (2014)] (effective Jan. 1, 2014).   
 55. § 8-201(i)(2)(iii) (2009).   
 56. § 8-201(i)(3). 
 57. The General Assembly kept the version of the statute requiring the State to pre-
serve evidence containing DNA material added by the 2003 amendments, but added the 
lengthy provision concerning situations in which the State cannot produce the requested 
DNA evidence.  Compare § 8-201(j)(3) (creating the procedures a court must follow when 
“the State is unable to produce scientific identification evidence”), with § 8-201(i) (2003) 
(creating a duty on the part of the State to preserve scientific identification evidence).      
 58. § 8-201(j)(3)(i) (2009).  If “the failure to produce evidence was the result of inten-
tional and willful destruction, the [post-conviction] court shall: 1. order a postconviction 
hearing . . .; and 2. . . . infer that the results of the postconviction DNA testing would have 
been favorable to the petitioner.”  § 8-201(j)(3)(ii).  But see Washington v. State, 424 Md. 
632, 37 A.3d 932, 950, 952 (2012) (“In reviewing the legislative history of § 8-201(j), specif-
ically the State’s duty to preserve scientific identification evidence, it is clear that the legis-
lature intended for this duty to be applied prospectively. . . .  [S]ubsection (j), and any re-
lief offered therein, does not apply to evidence that was lost or destroyed before the 
effective date of the statute on October 1, 2001.”).  
 59. For example, the 2009–2013 version of § 8-201 allows petitioners to file a motion 
for a new trial “on the grounds that the conviction was based on unreliable scientific iden-
tification evidence and a substantial possibility exists that the petitioner would not have 
been convicted without the evidence.”  § 8-201(c) (2009).  That provision, however, will be 
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2.  Instances of Direct Appeals to the Court of Appeals Under Section 
8-201 and Other Provisions of Maryland Law 
The procedure for appealing a trial court’s order denying a mo-
tion for a post-conviction search for or testing of DNA evidence is 
notable because Section 8-201 provides for a direct appeal of such or-
ders to the Court of Appeals.60  This form of appeal is relatively un-
common in Maryland, as it is only authorized in a limited number of 
cases.  The direct appeal provision of Section 8-201 states that “[a]n 
appeal to the court of appeals may be taken from an order entered 
under this section.”61  The General Assembly added the direct appeal 
provision to Section 8-201 in 2003.62  The version of Section 8-201 in 
effect after the 2003 amendments authorized a direct appeal to the 
Court of Appeals for orders entered under certain subsections,63 but 
the current version of Section 8-201, added by the 2008 amendments 
and effective January 1, 2009, makes no such distinction and allows a 
direct appeal from any order issued pursuant to Section 8-201.64  The 
Court of Appeals acknowledged the distinction between the different 
versions of the direct appeal provision, noting that the current version 
gives a “more liberal right to appeal.”65  Although Section 8-201(k)(6) 
states that an appeal “may be taken” to the Court of Appeals, the court 
has interpreted the provision to mean that “Section 8-201 clearly af-
fords the claimant a right to ‘an appeal.’”66  Thus, the Court of Appeals 
does not require a grant of certiorari to hear an appeal brought pur-
suant to Section 8-201.67
 
abrogated, along with the rest of the 2008 amendments on December 31, 2013.  § 8-201 
(2014).  But see Washington, 37 A.3d at 952–53 (noting that the decision to grant a new trial 
is left to the discretion of the trial court and is only subject to review by the Court of Ap-
peals for an abuse of discretion). 
   
 60. § 8-201(k)(6) (2009); see Simms v. State, 409 Md. 722, 724 n.2, 976 A.2d 1012, 1014 
n.2 (2009) (“The denial of a petition under § 8-201 is subject to direct appeal to this 
Court.”). 
 61. § 8-201(k)(6) (2009).   
 62. Gregg v. State, 409 Md. 698, 706 n.3, 976 A.2d 999, 1004 n.3 (2009). 
 63. § 8-201(j)(6) (2003) (“An appeal to the court of appeals may be taken from an or-
der entered under subsection (c) [court orders for DNA testing], (h)(2) [DNA testing re-
sults favorable to the petitioner], or (j)(4) [written objection to the State’s notice that it 
intends to dispose of DNA evidence] of this section.”). 
 64. § 8-201(k)(6) (2009) (“An appeal to the court of appeals may be taken from an 
order entered under this section.”).  
 65. Arrington v. State, 411 Md. 524, 542, 983 A.2d 1071, 1081 (2009). 
 66. Id.  (emphasis added). 
 67. Id. at 541–44, 983 A.2d at 1081–83 (“[T]he dissent erroneously avers that we can-
not take the merits of this cause because we did not grant certiorari.  [There is] clear legis-
lative intent that the certiorari process need not be followed . . . .”).  But see id. at 557–58, 
983 A.2d at 1090 (Battaglia, J., dissenting) (noting that the court was not presented with a 
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The Maryland General Assembly has authorized a similar remedy 
for a direct appeal to the Court of Appeals in only a very limited 
number of other circumstances.68  Of the four bases of jurisdiction for 
the Court of Appeals laid out in the Courts and Judicial Proceedings 
Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland, two provide for a direct 
appeal to the Court of Appeals.69  The Court of Appeals has 
“[e]xclusive appellate jurisdiction” over (1) “question[s] of law certi-
fied to it under the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act”70 
and (2) any criminal cases involving sentences of death71
 
petition for certiorari and arguing that the majority “has failed to acknowledge the differ-
ence between our exclusive jurisdiction, when the Legislature mandates that we take a case 
on direct appeal, and our discretionary jurisdiction, when we may take an appeal [because 
the court’s] jurisdiction in cases such as the present under Section 8-201 can only be exer-
cised under a certiorari grant”).  Judge Battaglia made the same certiorari argument in 
her dissenting opinion in Horton v. State.  412 Md. 1, 28, 985 A.2d 540, 555–56 (2009) (Bat-
taglia, J., dissenting).  It appears that Judge Battaglia has abandoned the certiorari argu-
ment, as she did not raise it in the subsequent decisions of Blake II and Washington v. State, 
and she did not participate in Arey II.   
 or an inmate 
 68. See Arrington, 411 Md. at 561–62, 983 A.2d at 1093 (describing in detail the jurisdic-
tion of the Court of Appeals and the cases that fall within the court’s exclusive jurisdic-
tion). 
 69. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 12-307 (LexisNexis 2006).   
 70. Id. § 12-307(3).  The Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act allows the 
Court of Appeals and the Court of Special Appeals to certify a question of law to be ans-
wered by the highest court of another state and allows the Court of Appeals to answer a 
question of law certified to it by a federal court or an appellate court of another state.  Id. 
§ 12-602 to -603.  The Court of Appeals explained that “the purpose of the Uniform Certi-
fication of Questions of Law Act is to obtain authoritative decisions concerning the law of a 
particular state or tribe, in order to assist federal courts, Native American tribal courts, and 
state appellate courts in other states in their decision-making processes.”  Piselli v. 75th St. 
Med., 371 Md. 188, 202, 808 A.2d 508, 516 (2002). 
 71. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 12-307(4).  Importantly, appeals of orders entered under Mar-
yland’s Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act (“UPPA”) or Maryland Rule 4-331, which 
governs motions for new trials in criminal cases, can only reach the Court of Appeals 
through the traditional certiorari process.  MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 7-109(a) (Lex-
isNexis 2008); MD. R. 8-202(b), -301(a).  Adopted by the Maryland General Assembly in 
1958, “[UPPA] protected a broad array of rights, placed limits on collateral litigation (es-
pecially through res judicata and ‘waiver’ provisions), and took a step toward unifying the 
various collateral remedies by making the postconviction process the primary means of 
asserting collateral claims.”  Michael A. Millemann, Collateral Remedies in Criminal Cases in 
Maryland: An Assessment, 64 MD. L. REV. 968, 991–92 (2005); see also id. at 997 (discussing 
the “[q]ualified [r]ight to [a]ppeal” under UPPA).  Rule 4-331 is one of “two provisions 
[of Maryland law] that allow some prisoners to assert newly discovered evidence, including 
of innocence, under limited circumstances”; Section 8-201 is the second.  Id. at 1014–15.  
Among those who may file motions for a new trial under Rule 4-331(c) are “any defendant 
who ‘at any time’ files a motion ‘based on DNA identification testing or other generally 
accepted scientific techniques the results of which, if proven, would show that the defen-
dant is innocent.’”  Id. at 1014. 
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deemed to be incompetent.72  Not only is the appellate jurisdiction 
over death penalty cases mandatory for the Court of Appeals, but it is 
also mandatory for the defendant.73  In addition to the exclusive ap-
pellate jurisdiction outlined in Section 12-307 of the Courts and Judi-
cial Proceedings Article, the Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction 
to review challenges to legislative redistricting plans74 and vacancies in 
the gubernatorial office,75 and exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals 
in cases of contested elections.76
C.  Court of Appeals Cases Involving Section 8-201 Petitions for DNA 
Testing  
 
The Court of Appeals has addressed Section 8-201 petitions for 
post-conviction DNA testing in eleven cases involving eight petition-
ers.77  The court decided eight cases before Blake II,78
 
 72. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 12-307(4).  The two other bases of jurisdiction for the Court of 
Appeals outlined in Section 12-307 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article are (1) 
filing a petition for certiorari from the Court of Special Appeals and (2) granting certiora-
ri from a circuit court when review by the Court of Appeals is necessary for uniform statu-
tory interpretation or is otherwise in the public interest.  Id. § 12-307(1)–(2). 
 and has decided 
 73. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-401(a)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011) (“After a 
death sentence is imposed and the judgment becomes final, the Court of Appeals shall re-
view the sentence on the record.” (emphasis added)). 
 74. MD. CONST. art. II, § 6(g). 
 75. Id. art. III, § 5.   
 76. MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 12-203(a)(3) (LexisNexis 2010).  In addition, an ap-
peal of an order from a circuit court administering a conservatorship or receivership that 
approves the transfer or sale of assets of a savings and loan association is within the “exclu-
sive and plenary jurisdiction” of the Court of Appeals.  MD. CODE ANN., FIN. INST. § 9-
712(d)(2) (LexisNexis 2011).    
 77. The Court of Appeals discussed Section 8-201 in two additional cases, but both cas-
es involved petitions for a writ of actual innocence in light of a claim of newly discovered 
evidence under Section 8-301 of the Criminal Procedure Article of the Annotated Code of 
Maryland.  See Douglas v. State, 423 Md. 156, 163–64, 182, 31 A.3d 250, 254–55, 265 (2011) 
(reviewing denial of a petition for writ of innocence); State v. Matthews, 415 Md. 286, 294–
98, 999 A.2d 1050, 1055–57 (2010) (applying Section 8-301).  The court incorporated Sec-
tion 8-201 into the Douglas and Matthews decisions by analogizing to its “liberal construc-
tion” of Section 8-201 in prior cases.  Douglas, 423 Md. at 182–83, 31 A.3d at 265–66; Mat-
thews, 415 Md. at 297–98, 999 A.2d at 1057.   
That only eleven Section 8-201 cases have reached the Court of Appeals is not meant 
to suggest that few petitions are filed under Section 8-201 or that the number of petitions 
filed is consistent with the number of incarcerated individuals who claim innocence and 
seek access to DNA testing.  See Rodricks, supra note 5 (referencing an interview with Mi-
chelle Nethercott, co-director of the Baltimore branch of the Innocence Project, in which 
Ms. Nethercott remarked that “hundreds of inmates across [Maryland have] asked [her 
staff] to consider their cases”).   
 78. The court decided the following cases prior to Blake II: Horton v. State, 412 Md. 1, 
985 A.2d 540 (2009); Thompson II, 411 Md. 664, 985 A.2d 32 (2009); Arrington v. State, 411 
Md. 524, 983 A.2d 1071 (2009); Simms v. State, 409 Md. 722, 976 A.2d 1012 (2009); Gregg 
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two cases since.79  The eleven decisions can be separated into two 
groups: (1) “search for evidence” cases and (2) “evidence in hand” 
cases.  In the “search for evidence” line of cases, the petitioners re-
quested that the State conduct a search for potentially exculpatory 
DNA evidence allegedly in the State’s possession.80  In the “evidence 
in hand” group, the State had the evidence in its possession, and the 
petitioners requested that the State test the evidence or take other ac-
tion.81
1.  “Search for Evidence” Cases  
 
In October 2006, the Court of Appeals issued its first decision in 
a post-conviction DNA testing case involving a search for evidence—
Blake v. State (“Blake I”).82  The court found that the Circuit Court for 
Baltimore City “erred in summarily dismissing” Mr. Blake’s petition 
because Mr. Blake was not given “an opportunity to respond to the 
State’s assertion that the evidence at issue no longer was in its posses-
sion.”83  Remanding the case to circuit court, the Court of Appeals 
reasoned that Section 8-201 presumes that the requested DNA evi-
dence exists, and therefore, does not “contemplate circumstances 
where the evidence has been destroyed before the adoption of the 
statute, or where there is a factual dispute over the existence of DNA 
testing evidence.”84  The court held that “when an inmate files a peti-
tion for postconviction DNA testing, the State should make an exten-
sive search for the [requested] evidence.”85
 
v. State, 409 Md. 698, 976 A.2d 999 (2009); Arey I, 400 Md. 491, 929 A.2d 501 (2007); 
Thompson I, 395 Md. 240, 909 A.2d 1035 (2006); Blake I, 395 Md. 213, 909 A.2d 1020 
(2006).      
  Relying on a 1999 report 
from the National Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence 
 79. Washington v. State, 424 Md. 632, 37 A.3d 932 (2012); Arey II, 422 Md. 328, 29 A.3d 
986 (2011).  Eight of the eleven cases originated in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.  
Arey II, 422 Md. 328, 29 A.3d 986; Blake II, 418 Md. 445, 15 A.3d 787; Thompson II, 411 Md. 
664, 985 A.2d 32; Simms, 409 Md. 722, 976 A.2d 1012; Gregg, 409 Md. 698, 976 A.2d 999; 
Arey I, 400 Md. 491, 929 A.2d 501; Thompson I, 395 Md. 240, 909 A.2d 1035; Blake I, 395 Md. 
213, 909 A.2d 1020.  Two of the cases originated in the Circuit Court for Montgomery 
County.  Horton, 412 Md. 1, 985 A.2d 540; Arrington, 411 Md. 524, 983 A.2d 1071.  The 
Court of Appeals’ eleventh and most recent Section 8-201 case originated in Wicomico 
County.  Washington, 424 Md. 632, 37 A.3d 932.   
 80. See infra Part I.C.1. 
 81. See infra Part I.C.2.  
 82. 395 Md. 213, 909 A.2d 1020 (2006).  For a more detailed discussion of Blake I, see 
infra Part I.C.3.a.   
 83. Blake I, 395 Md. at 222, 909 A.2d at 1025. 
 84. Id. at 223, 909 A.2d at 1026. 
 85. Id. at 232, 909 A.2d at 1031.   
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(“1999 Commission Report”), the court noted that “the most likely 
places where the evidence may be found” include: 
[1] Police department evidence or property rooms [because 
e]vidence is often found here if the evidence was never 
tested or it was sent to the State crime laboratory, which 
then returned it.   
[2] Prosecutor’s office [because e]vidence is often found 
here when it has been introduced at trial.   
[3] State and local crime laboratories [because they] often 
retain slides or other pieces of evidence after conducting 
testing [even though they] usually return to the police de-
partment the clothing and vaginal swabs that are introduced 
as exhibits at trial.   
[4] Hospitals, clinics, or doctors’ offices where sexual assault 
kits are prepared.   
[5] Defense investigators.   
[6] Courthouse property/evidence rooms.   
[7] Offices of defense counsel in jurisdictions that require 
parties to preserve exhibits produced at trial.   
[8] Independent crime laboratories.   
[9] Clerks of court.   
[10] Court reporters.86
The Court of Appeals had its second opportunity to interpret 
and apply Section 8-201 nine months later in Arey v. State (“Arey I”),
 
87 
holding that the State must “perform[] a reasonable search and dem-
onstrate[] sufficiently a prima facie case . . . that the requested evi-
dence no longer exists.”88  In 2002, Mr. Arey filed a petition under 
Section 8-201, requesting that the State retest the blood evidence re-
covered from the shirt he was wearing when the police interrogated 
him.89
 
 86. Id. at 220–22, 909 A.2d at 1024–25 (quoting NAT’L COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF 
DNA EVIDENCE, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, POSTCONVICTION DNA TESTING: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HANDLING REQUESTS 46 (1999), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/177626.pdf).   
  Relying on Blake I, the Court of Appeals noted that the burden 
 87. 400 Md. 491, 929 A.2d 501 (2007). 
 88. Id. at 505, 929 A.2d at 509.  In 1974, Mr. Arey “was convicted of first degree murder 
and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence,” for which he received a 
sentence of life imprisonment.  Id. at 494–95, 929 A.2d at 503.     
 89. Id. at 494, 496, 929 A.2d at 503–04.  Mr. Arey has blood type O and the victim was 
type AB.  Id. at 496, 929 A.2d at 503–04.  At his trial and throughout the duration of his 
Section 8-201 petition, Mr. Arey claimed that the State found blood type AB on the shirt 
because “he became nervous and started to pick the pimples on his face [, which] caused 
small amounts of blood to pool on the open sores,” and that the bacteria from the pimples 
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of proof is on the State to show that requested evidence does not ex-
ist.90  The court found that an affidavit from the police officer in 
charge of the Baltimore Police Department’s Evidence Control Unit 
(“ECU”), stating that he had checked the ECU database but had not 
found the shirt, was insufficient to prove that the evidence no longer 
existed.91  The Court of Appeals concluded that the State’s search for 
potentially exculpatory DNA evidence must be reasonable, meaning 
that “the State needs to check any place the evidence could reasona-
bly be found, unless there is a written record that the evidence had 
been destroyed in accordance with then existing protocol.”92
The Court of Appeals did not revisit the “search for evidence” 
line of cases until over two years later, in 2009, when it decided Horton 
v. State,
   
93 holding that although the State’s search for DNA evidence 
“undoubtedly went several steps beyond the searches conducted in 
Blake . . . and Arey,” it failed to meet the standard for a reasonable 
search developed in those cases.94  Mr. Horton filed his Section 8-201 
petition in 2006, requesting that the hospital where the victim had 
been treated “produce any physical evidence related to the victim.”95  
He subsequently “requested that the State search for physical evi-
dence collected from the victim.”96
 
mixed with the blood and “may have skewed the results of the blood tests.”  Id., 929 A.2d at 
504. 
  The State could not locate the 
 90. Id. at 502, 929 A.2d at 507. 
 91. Id. at 499, 503, 929 A.2d at 506, 508. 
 92. Id. at 503–04, 929 A.2d at 508.  The court was referring to destruction of evidence 
protocols in place at police departments, the offices of the clerks of court, and similar of-
fices.  Id. at 503, 929 A.2d at 508.  In addition, the court held that while a petitioner is not 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a Section 8-201 petition, a circuit court should hold a 
hearing “if the court determines that there is a genuine factual dispute as to whether the 
evidence exists.”  Id. at 507, 929 A.2d at 510.  The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit 
court’s denial of the Section 8-201 petition and remanded Mr. Arey’s case.  Id. at 494–95, 
929 A.2d at 503.     
 93. 412 Md. 1, 985 A.2d 540 (2009). 
 94. Id. at 15, 985 A.2d at 548.  In 1983, “[Mr.] Horton was convicted of first degree 
rape, assault with intent to maim, and burglary,” for which he received a life sentence and 
two concurrent ten-year sentences.  Id. at 8–9, 985 A.2d at 544.  Among the evidence re-
covered from the crime scene were blood and semen samples, which were not tested for 
DNA.  Id. at 9, 985 A.2d at 544.  The medical examiner did, however, perform a blood-
typing test and “determined that the samples were consistent with blood group A, which is 
the blood group of both Horton and the victim.”  Id. 
 95. Id., 985 A.2d at 545.  The State introduced an affidavit from the hospital and a 
copy of the laboratory’s record retention policy, which stated that the hospital did not 
keep slides for longer than ten years, but the documents did not provide information on 
the retention policies in place at the time the incident occurred in 1982.  Id. at 10–11, 985 
A.2d at 545–46.  In addition, the attorney for the hospital reported that there was no 
record of the victim being treated there.  Id. at 11, 985 A.2d at 546.    
 96. Id. 
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evidence, but it did produce various documents that indicated the 
evidence “had been approved for destruction.”97  The circuit court 
found that “there is no reasonable basis to believe that any further in-
vestigation is going to lead to discovery of any evidence” and dis-
missed the petition.98  The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, 
holding that even though the State’s search came close to the stan-
dards set in Blake I and Arey I, the circuit court should not have dis-
missed the petition because Mr. Horton still wished to search “nar-
rowly tailored additional areas.”99
Two years after Horton, in 2011, the Court of Appeals issued Blake 
II,
   
100 its second decision in Mr. Blake’s case, holding that the “‘clearly 
erroneous’ standard of review” applies to a trial court’s determination 
that the State conducted a reasonable search for the requested DNA 
evidence.101  Six months later, the court issued its second decision in 
Mr. Arey’s case, Arey v. State (“Arey II”),102 but declined to review the 
circuit court’s determination that the search for evidence was reason-
able.103  The court remanded Mr. Arey’s case based on its finding that 
the circuit court prematurely denied the Section 8-201 petition by not 
affording Mr. Arey an opportunity to respond to a “pivotal affidavit” 
from the State.104
The Court of Appeals’ most recent pronouncement on the rea-
sonableness of a search for potentially exculpatory DNA evidence is 
Washington v. State,
   
105
 
 97. Id. at 12, 985 A.2d at 546 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 in which the court reaffirmed the clearly erro-
 98. Id. at 14–15, 985 A.2d at 548 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 99. Id. at 15, 985 A.2d at 548.  The Court of Appeals reasoned that the documentation 
“provided by the State show[ed] that evidence was authorized for destruction, but the 
State failed to establish that any evidence was actually destroyed.”  Id. at 16, 985 A.2d at 
549.  Furthermore, the court held that the State should have tried to determine the evi-
dence retention and destruction protocol in place in Montgomery County in 1982, as it 
required in Arey I.  Id., 985 A.2d at 548.  But see id. at 24, 985 A.2d at 553 (Harrell, J., dis-
senting) (“Arey does not require that each of its enumerated locations be searched in every 
case.  Arey requires only a search of locations where the record indicates relevant evidence 
reasonably is likely to be found.”).   
 100. 418 Md. 445, 15 A.3d 787 (2011). 
 101. Id. at 460, 15 A.3d at 796.  For a more detailed discussion of Blake II, see infra Part 
I.C.3.b. 
 102. 422 Md. 328, 29 A.3d 986 (2011). 
 103. Id. at 334, 29 A.3d at 989 (“Arey argues that the State has failed to look through a 
large mass of ‘old clothing’ for the shirt and has neglected to search for the blood slides 
used by the crime laboratory for blood type analysis.  These issues, in our view, are best left 
for the hearing judge . . . .”).  But see id. at 338–39, 29 A.3d at 992 (noting that “the State 
has taken considerable steps to conduct a reasonable search for the evidence in this case”). 
 104. Id. at 330 & n.4, 29 A.3d at 987 & n.4. 
 105. 424 Md. 632, 37 A.3d 932 (2012). 
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neous standard of review announced in Blake II.106  The Circuit Court 
for Wicomico County granted Mr. Washington-Bey’s Section 8-201 pe-
tition for a search for DNA evidence in 2009 and served an order “on 
various law enforcement agencies that may have had possession of or 
access to biological evidence related to [Mr. Washington-Bey’s] 
case.”107  In response, the circuit court received several affidavits, 
which indicated that no one was able to locate any of the evidence or 
explain if, when, or how it had been destroyed.108  In March 2011, af-
ter holding a hearing on Mr. Washington-Bey’s subsequent Petition 
for Production and Testing of DNA Material and Motion for a New 
Trial, the circuit court “concluded that the evidence was destroyed 
prior to the time the unsuccessful searches began [in 2002]” and de-
nied the requested relief.109  On appeal, the Court of Appeals held 
that “it was not clearly erroneous for the hearing judge to determine 
that the requested scientific identification evidence no longer exists” 
and affirmed the circuit court’s judgment.110
 
 106. Id. at 943.  The petitioner, known as Michael D. Washington-Bey, was convicted of 
first degree rape, second degree rape, third degree sexual offense, fourth degree sexual 
offense, assault, and battery in 1990 and sentenced to life in prison.  Id. at 933 & n.1, 937.  
At Mr. Washington-Bey’s trial, a serologist testified that Mr. Washington-Bey was “a non-
secretor with blood type O,” meaning that he did not “’secret[e] into [his] other body flu-
ids other than [his] blood.’”  Id. at 936 (quoting the serologist).  She noted that it was 
possible “that a non-secretor contributed to the semen found on the vaginal swabs,” but 
“that it was impossible that the fluids on the underwear came from” Mr. Washington-Bey.  
Id. 
  Thus, Washington 
marked the second time the Court of Appeals applied the clearly er-
roneous standard of review to a circuit court’s finding that the State 
conducted a reasonable search for DNA evidence and the second 
 107. Id. at 933.  Mr. Washington-Bey sought to have the State produce the underwear 
the victim wore the night of the attack, vaginal swabs taken from the victim at the hospital 
where she was treated, and the evidence-retention policies of the hospital, crime laborato-
ry, and police department that were in place at the time of the attack.  Id. at 939, 947–48. 
 108. Id. at 937–39.  The affidavits were produced by the Deputy State’s Attorney for Wi-
comico County, the Maryland State Police Department, the Wicomico County Sheriff’s 
Department, the Maryland State Police Forensic Sciences Division, and Peninsula Regional 
Medical Center.  Id. at 938–39. 
 109. Id. at 939, 941–42. 
 110. Id. at 949, 952.  The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the State had not pro-
duced evidence retention protocols in place at the time of Mr. Washington-Bey’s convic-
tion, even though the Wicomico County Sheriff’s Office had “older versions of 
the evidence retention policies.”  Id. at 947.  The court found, however, that “even if the 
protocols from the time of [Mr. Washington-Bey’s] conviction to the time he filed the 
[Section 8-201 petition] were produced, they would only indicate that the requested scien-
tific evidence was in the possession of the Sheriff’s Office,” and “[t]he hearing judge had 
substantial evidence before him in this case to determine . . . that [the evidence] was de-
stroyed prior to the enactment date of the statute.”  Id. at 947, 949. 
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time that the court denied relief to a petitioner under Section 8-
201.111
2.  “Evidence in Hand” Cases 
    
Unlike the “search for evidence” cases, in the “evidence in hand” 
group, there is no dispute as to the existence of DNA evidence in the 
State’s possession.  In this set of cases, the Court of Appeals has pri-
marily addressed petitioners’ requests to test the DNA evidence and 
their motions for new trials.  In Thompson v. State (“Thompson I”),112 
the first “evidence in hand” case, the Court of Appeals held that a trial 
court cannot issue an order requiring preservation of DNA evidence 
for future testing when “there [is] only enough material for a single 
test” because imposing such an order would completely preclude test-
ing of any DNA evidence.113  In reversing the circuit court’s partial 
denial of Mr. Thompson’s Section 8-201 petition, the Court of Ap-
peals reasoned that Section 8-201 “manifests a legislative intent in fa-
vor of DNA testing of potentially exculpatory physical evidence.”114  
Thus, the court ruled that the circuit court could not order the reten-
tion of evidence, even though such an order is permitted by Section 8-
201(e)(3),115 if doing so would prevent the petitioner from accessing 
the DNA testing that the legislature intended.116
 
 111. See id. at 947, 948 (finding “that the facts of [Mr. Washington-Bey’s] case are ana-
logous to the facts in Blake II” and holding “that the Circuit Court’s conclusion that the 
search performed by the State in this case was reasonable and was not clearly erroneous”).  
In addition to denying relief based on the clearly erroneous standard of review for the rea-
sonableness of a search for DNA evidence, the Court of Appeals found that “the State’s 
duty to preserve scientific identification evidence . . . begins as of the date the statute was 
enacted and is not to be applied retroactively” and that the denial of Mr. Washington-Bey's 
Motion for a New Trial “was not an abuse of discretion[ because Mr. Washington-Bey] did 
not establish that the serological testing and results offered by the State at trial were unre-
liable and that there was a substantial possibility that [he] would not have been convicted 
without the serological evidence.”  Id. at 934–35. 
   
 112. 395 Md. 240, 909 A.2d 1035 (2006).   
 113. Id. at 251, 909 A.2d at 1042.  In 1988, Mr. Thompson was convicted “of first degree 
felony murder, first degree rape, burglary, and carrying a weapon with intent to injure.”  
Id. at 245, 909 A.2d at 1039.  He filed a Section 8-201 petition for DNA “testing of the se-
men samples taken from the victim and the blood-stained blue-jeans” and for a compari-
son of “cytology slides containing the pubic hairs taken from [Mr. Thompson] with the 
pubic hairs found on the victim.”  Id. at 246–47, 909 A.2d at 1039–40.  The circuit court 
granted the request to test the semen samples and jeans, but not the cytology slides.  Id. at 
247, 909 A.2d at 1040. 
 114. Id. at 245, 251, 909 A.2d at 1038–39, 1042.  
 115. The 2008 amendments renumbered the provisions of Section 8-201, but both the 
pre- and post-amendment versions of the statute allow a court to issue an order requiring 
“the preservation of some of the sample for replicate testing and analysis.”  § 8-201(f)(3) 
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Nearly three years later, in Gregg v. State,117 the Court of Appeals 
ruled that Section 8-201 is a remedial statute and that, therefore, the 
amendments are subject to retroactive application.118  The court also 
held that Mr. Gregg made out a prima facie case of entitlement to DNA 
testing because Section 8-201 “only requires a showing that [there is] 
a reasonable probability that the DNA testing . . . has the scientific po-
tential to produce relevant exculpatory or mitigating evidence,” and 
does not require a showing that the jury would have returned a dif-
ferent verdict if it had been presented with the results of the DNA 
testing.119
 
(2009); see also § 8-201(e)(3) (2014) (Section 8-201 reverts back to the pre-2008 version on 
January 1, 2014). 
   
 116. Thompson I, 395 Md. at 251–52, 909 A.2d at 1042.  The Court of Appeals also held 
that the trial court did not have the power to order that the DNA testing results “be prec-
luded from use in further proceedings if samples for retesting are not retained,” reasoning 
“that preclusion of the use of the DNA test results is an extreme and drastic sanction un-
der this statute [and that] exclusion of the results of DNA testing in future proceedings is 
tantamount to a sanction of dismissal.”  Id. at 257, 260–61, 909 A.2d at 1046, 1048. 
 117. 409 Md. 698, 976 A.2d 999 (2009).   
 118. Id. at 715–16, 976 A.2d at 1008–09; see also supra text accompanying notes 44–45.  
Mr. Gregg was convicted “of first degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and use of 
a handgun in the commission of a felony” for a 2002 shooting death.  Gregg, 409 Md. at 
702, 704, 976 A.2d at 1001–02.  In his Section 8-201 petition, Mr. Gregg requested “DNA 
testing of epithelial cells that were collected on the” trigger of the .45 caliber handgun 
used in the shooting.  Id. at 701–02, 976 A.2d at 1001.  The cells had not been tested for 
DNA before the trial.  Id. at 703, 976 A.2d at 1002.  The State contended that the version 
of Section 8-201 in effect before 2003, which would have required Mr. Gregg “to show that 
the . . . evidence was not previously tested for reasons beyond his control,” should govern 
the Court of Appeals’ decision.  Id. at 712–13, 976 A.2d at 1007.  Under the State’s theory, 
because Mr. Gregg “could have sought to have the cells subjected to DNA analysis before 
trial,” the trial court rightfully dismissed the Section 8-201 petition.  Id. at 705, 976 A.2d at 
1003. 
 119. Id. at 719–20, 976 A.2d at 1011.  The Court of Appeals reversed the post-conviction 
trial court’s decision and remanded Mr. Gregg’s case with a requirement that the trial 
court order the DNA testing.  Id. at 702, 976 A.2d at 1001.   
The Court of Appeals issued a decision in Simms v. State on the same day it issued the 
Gregg decision, holding that Mr. Simms’s Section 8-201 petition should be liberally con-
strued, not only because Mr. Simms filed the petition pro se, but also because “of the salu-
tary purpose of the postconviction DNA statute . . . and the lack, so far, of rules of proce-
dure to guide the process.”  409 Md. 722, 731–32, 976 A.2d 1012, 1018 (2009).  For a 
discussion of the lack of procedural rules governing Section 8-201 petitions, see infra note 
145.  In 1998, Mr. Simms was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and sen-
tenced to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment.  Simms, 409 Md. at 724, 976 A.2d at 
1013–14.  In 2008, he filed a pro se Section 8-201 petition for DNA testing of evidence col-
lected during the murder investigation, which the circuit court summarily denied.  Id., 976 
A.2d at 1014.  The public defender’s office represented Mr. Simms in his appeal before 
the Court of Appeals.  Id.  The Court of Appeals found that Mr. Simms made a prima facie 
case of entitlement to STR testing when he claimed that testing physical evidence collected 
from the murder scene would exclude him as the perpetrator of the crime because STR 
“testing is far more sensitive and discriminating than the RFLP [restriction fragment 
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The Court of Appeals had its first opportunity to review the deni-
al of a motion for a new trial based on the results of newly discovered 
evidence from DNA testing in Thompson v. State (“Thompson II”).120  
Relying on the decisions of other state and federal courts “that have 
developed modern DNA postconviction jurisprudence,”121 the court 
emphasized the need to reevaluate a petitioner’s prior confession to a 
crime when DNA evidence calls the validity of that confession into 
question.122  In ruling that the 2008 amendment authorizing a direct 
appeal to the Court of Appeals applied retroactively,123 the court held 
that Mr. Thompson “[was] entitled to the benefit of the more liberal 
[substantial possibility of acquittal] standard set by the 2008 legisla-
tion for determining his eligibility for a new trial.”124
The Court of Appeals once again addressed the denial of a mo-
tion for a new trial in light of newly discovered DNA evidence in Ar-
rington v. State.
   
125
 
length polymorphism] and PCR testing that was preformed (sic) on the selected tested 
items.”  Id. at 726, 732–33, 976 A.2d at 1015, 1018–19 (alteration in original) (internal qu-
otation marks omitted).  The Court of Appeals remanded the case so that the trial court 
could order the State to file an answer to Mr. Simms’s Section 8-201 petition.  Id. at 734, 
976 A.2d at 1020. 
  The court rejected the State’s jurisdictional certi-
 120. 411 Md. 664, 685, 985 A.2d 32, 44 (2009).  The court granted Mr. Thompson’s re-
quest for DNA testing in Thompson I.  Id. at 672, 985 A.2d at 36.  The post-conviction court 
subsequently found that DNA testing excluded Mr. Thompson as the victim’s rapist, but 
denied the motion for a new trial because the results of the DNA testing did “not show 
that [Mr. Thompson was] innocent of the underlying crime of burglary.”  Id. at 674–75, 
985 A.2d at 38.  The Court of Appeals remanded the case for the circuit court to “consider 
whether this highly persuasive new evidence might have made a difference to the jury as to 
the rape and its dual service as a predicate felony for the felony murder charge.”  Id. at 
689, 985 A.2d at 47.   
 121. Id. at 685–89, 985 A.2d 44–46. 
 122. Id. at 692–94, 985 A.2d at 48–50.  Mr. Thompson admitted to the police during an 
interrogation and also testified at his co-conspirator’s trial that he had watched his co-
conspirator rape the victim.  Id. at 669–70, 985 A.2d at 35.  In addition, the Court of Ap-
peals focused on the “special impact” of scientific evidence in cases involving crimes of 
sexual assault.  Id. at 686–89, 985 A.2d at 44–46.  For a discussion of the connection be-
tween false confessions and exonerations through post-conviction DNA testing, see infra 
Part II.C.   
 123. Thompson II, 411 Md. at 680, 985 A.2d at 41.  The court’s retroactivity holding al-
lowed it to review the post-conviction court’s denial of a motion for a new trial as an ap-
peal brought under Section 8-201, even though Section 8-201 did not have a new trial pro-
vision when Mr. Thompson filed his motion.  Id. at 680–81, 985 A.2d at 41–42. 
 124. Id. at 667, 985 A.2d at 33–34.   
 125. 411 Md. 524, 527, 983 A.2d 1071, 1071–72 (2009).  In 1995, Mr. Arrington was 
convicted of second degree murder for a stabbing death.  Id. at 527, 983 A.2d at 1073.  He 
filed his Section 8-201 petition in 2003, requesting that the State test blood stains found on 
the sweat pants he was allegedly wearing on the night of the stabbing and a sample of the 
victim’s blood.  Id. at 533–34, 538, 983 A.2d at 1076, 1079.  The DNA results contradicted 
the evidence introduced by the State at Mr. Arrington’s trial, but the post-conviction court 
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orari challenge, providing a detailed discussion of the direct appeal 
provision of Section 8-201 and the “clear legislative intent” not to fol-
low the certiorari process.126 Applying the “substantial possibility stan-
dard” of Section 8-201, the court concluded that “the DNA evidence 
obtained after [Mr. Arrington’s] conviction provides a substantial 
possibility that the jury would have reached a different outcome had 
this evidence been presented at trial” and remanded the case to the 
circuit court for a new trial.127
3.  Blake I and Blake II: Review in the Court of Appeals of Mr. 
Blake’s Section 8-201 Petition for a Search for DNA Evidence  
 
George E. Blake’s case was the first case in which the Court of 
Appeals applied the clearly erroneous standard of review to a trial 
court’s determination that the State conducted a reasonable search 
for DNA evidence.  Mr. Blake filed a Section 8-201 petition in the Cir-
cuit Court for Baltimore City on December 1, 2004, for DNA testing 
of evidence used to convict him of first degree rape and first degree 
sexual offense in January 1982.128  In Blake II, the Court of Appeals ul-
timately affirmed the circuit court’s denial of Mr. Blake’s Section 8-
201 petition by applying a clearly erroneous standard of review to the 
determination that the State conducted a reasonable search for po-
tentially exculpatory DNA evidence and conclusion that no additional 
searches were required to satisfy the standards of Section 8-201.129
a.  History of Mr. Blake’s Case   
 
On January 7, 1982, a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
convicted Mr. Blake of first degree rape and first degree sexual of-
fense for an incident that occurred on July 27, 1981.130  He subse-
quently received a sentence of two consecutive life terms.131
 
denied the motion for a new trial because it did not find that there was a substantial possi-
bility that the jury would have been persuaded by the new evidence.  Id. at 537, 983 A.2d at 
1078–79. 
  During 
the trial, the State introduced a Baltimore City Police Department 
(“BCPD”) Laboratory Report, which identified twelve “specimens” 
 126. Id. at 541–44, 983 A.2d at 1080–83; see also supra text accompanying notes 65–67. 
 127. Arrington, 411 Md. at 527, 550, 556, 983 A.2d at 1072, 1086, 1089.  The Court of 
Appeals emphasized that the jury’s “keen awareness” of blood evidence in the questions 
submitted during deliberations after Mr. Arrington’s trial contributed to this “substantial 
possibility” finding.  Id. at 552–55, 983 A.2d at 1087–89.  
 128. Blake I, 395 Md. 213, 216, 909 A.2d 1020, 1021 (2006). 
 129. 418 Md. 445, 460–62, 15 A.3d 787, 796–97 (2011). 
 130. Id. at 447, 15 A.3d at 788. 
 131. Blake I, 395 Md. at 216, 909 A.2d at 1022. 
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that had been recovered from the victim.132  The police also recov-
ered eight additional pieces of evidence, including hair, sheets, and 
underwear.133  After a laboratory examination, the BCPD filed the 
evidence in its Evidence Control Section under the property numbers 
858944 and 858947.134
Mr. Blake filed his Section 8-201 petition for post-conviction 
DNA testing in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on December 1, 
2004, and requested a hearing and DNA testing of the evidence used 
to convict him at trial.
 
135  After filing an initial motion to dismiss on 
January 21, 2005, the State filed a supplemental motion to dismiss on 
May 17, 2005, contending that the requested evidence “had been de-
stroyed well before October 1, 2001.”136  The circuit court summarily 
dismissed Mr. Blake’s petition that same day, “without holding a hear-
ing or otherwise giving [Mr. Blake] an opportunity to respond to the 
State’s dispositive motion.”137  Mr. Blake filed an appeal with the Mar-
yland Court of Special Appeals, which transferred the appeal to the 
Court of Appeals, in accordance with Md. Rule 8-132.138
In October 2006, in Blake I, the Court of Appeals held that the 
circuit court erred in summarily dismissing Mr. Blake’s petition.
 
139
 
 132. Blake II, 418 Md. at 452, 15 A.3d at 791.  The specimens included a micro slide, 
four vaginal swabs, three oral swabs, and four additional unlabeled swabs. Id. at 454, 15 
A.3d at 793.  
  
Noting that Section 8-201 does not provide the procedures to be fol-
lowed when the State alleges that the requested evidence no longer 
exists, the court concluded that “[f]undamental fairness” requires a 
trial court to “give a petitioner notice of and an opportunity to re-
 133. Specifically, the police recovered head hair, pubic hair, pubic combings, multico-
lored underwear, a multicolored fitted bedsheet, a multicolored flat bedsheet, a multico-
lored pillow case, and a blood sample from the victim.  Id. 
 134. Id. at 452, 15 A.3d at 791.  While the laboratory report referred to the “Evidence 
Control Section,” it appears that today this division of the BCPD is called the Evidence 
Control Unit (“ECU”).  Id. at 451–52, 15 A.3d at 791. 
 135. Blake I, 395 Md. at 216, 909 A.2d at 1021. 
 136. Id. at 217, 909 A.2d at 1022.  The supplemental motion included: (1) a letter from 
the Assistant State’s Attorney to the BCPD requesting that the ECU conduct a search for 
evidence related to Mr. Blake’s case, and (2) an internal BCPD memorandum, which 
stated that the ECU did not find any evidence.  Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id.  Under Maryland Court Rule 8-132, “[i]f the Court of Appeals or the Court of 
Special Appeals determines that an appellant has improperly noted an appeal to it . . . the 
Court shall . . . transfer the action to the court apparently having jurisdiction.”  MD. R. 8-
132.  Thus, Mr. Blake’s appeal to the Court of Special Appeals was unnecessary because 
Section 8-201 provides for a direct appeal to the Court of Appeals.  See supra text accom-
panying notes 60–66.    
 139. Blake I, 395 Md. at 222, 909 A.2d at 1025. 
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spond to the State’s allegation.”140  The Court of Appeals ruled that 
the State has the burden of establishing that it no longer has the re-
quested DNA evidence in its possession.141  Citing the 1999 Commis-
sion Report, the court noted that the State should extensively search 
for DNA evidence, including the “nontraditional sources” among the 
ten locations where evidence is most likely to be found.142  The court 
remarked that “[s]imply asking a police officer to check an evidence 
unit locker is not sufficient,” and that “[a]t a minimum,” the State 
must produce an affidavit to support the claim that the requested evi-
dence does not exist.143
On remand, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City determined 
that the State had satisfied its burden of persuasion in establishing 
that it was not in possession of the requested DNA evidence and again 
dismissed Mr. Blake’s petition.
   
144  In reaching this determination, the 
circuit court held four hearings145 and ordered the State to produce 
“the protocols for evidence retention and/or destruction” at several 
facilities, including the BCPD and the State’s Attorney’s Office.146  At 
the final hearing on April 7, 2010, counsel for Mr. Blake requested a 
new search of the police department’s ECU and the State’s Attorney’s 
Office.147
 
 140. Id. at 223–28, 909 A.2d at 1026–28.  The Court of Appeals found that “the failure of 
the Circuit Court to provide any notice to [Mr. Blake] violated his rights to due process.”  
Id. at 230, 909 A.2d at 1030.   
  The State agreed to provide affidavits from staff at the ECU, 
 141. Id. at 232, 909 A.2d at 1031. 
 142. Id. at 232–33, 909 A.2d at 1031–32.  For a list of the ten locations, see supra text ac-
companying note 86.   
 143. Blake I, 395 Md. at 232–33, 909 A.2d at 1031–32.   
 144. Blake II, 418 Md. 445, 450, 15 A.3d 787, 790 (2011).   
 145. Id.  “The hearings were held on November 21, 2008, February 20, 2009, June 12, 
2009, and April 7, 2010.”  Id. at 450 n.1, 15 A.3d at 790 n.1.  Judge Kaye A. Allison of the 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City presided over all of the hearings.  Apr. 7, 2010 Hearing 
Transcript, Ex. 18 at 1, Blake II, 418 Md. 445, 15 A.3d 787 (No. 58); June 12, 2009 Hearing 
Transcript, Ex. 11 at 1, Blake II, 418 Md. 445, 15 A.3d 787 (No. 58); Feb. 20, 2009 Hearing 
Transcript, Ex. 7 at 1, Blake II, 418 Md. 445, 15 A.3d 787 (No. 58); Nov. 21, 2008 Hearing 
Transcript, Ex. 6 at 1, Blake II, 418 Md. 445, 15 A.3d 787 (No. 58).  At the November 21, 
2008, hearing, Judge Allison acknowledged the lack of procedure surrounding searches 
for potentially exculpatory DNA evidence under Section 8-201, remarking that “we are bas-
ically going blind.”  Nov. 21, 2008 Hearing Transcript, at 22.  With respect to the docu-
mentation that the State had to produce to prove that it conducted a reasonable search, 
Judge Allison stated, “I think that’s up to [the State,]” and “I’m not going to direct [the 
State] exactly how to do it.”  Id. at 24–25.   
 146. Sept. 3, 2009 Court Order in the Cir. Ct. for Balt. City, Ex. 17, Blake II, 418 Md. 
445, 15 A.3d 787 (No. 58).  The circuit court required the State to provide the evidence 
retention and destruction policies dating back to the time of Mr. Blake’s trial at the follow-
ing locations: BCPD’s ECU and offsite storage facility, State’s Attorney’s Office, clerk’s of-
fice, court reporter’s office, and Mercy Hospital, where the victim was treated.  Id. 
 147. Apr. 7, 2010 Hearing Transcript, supra note 145, at 20–21. 
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Mercy Hospital emergency room and archives, and Forensic Investiga-
tions Unit of the State’s Attorney’s Office.148  On May 17, 2010, satis-
fied with the State’s production of the promised affidavits, the circuit 
court entered a final order denying Mr. Blake’s petition.149  Mr. Blake 
filed a timely appeal from the circuit court’s decision with the Court 
of Appeals, specifically alleging that the searches of two of the ten 
“most likely places” mentioned in the 1999 Commission Report—the 
ECU and the State’s Attorney’s office—were inadequate.150
b.  Blake II: Establishing the “Clearly Erroneous” Standard of 
Review  
   
In Blake II, the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s deci-
sion to deny Mr. Blake’s request that the State conduct additional 
searches.151  Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Joseph F. Murphy, 
Jr., found that there was “no merit” in Mr. Blake’s arguments that the 
searches of the ECU, offsite warehouse, and State’s Attorney’s Office 
were inadequate.152  The Court of Appeals based its decision on a de-
termination that a “‘clearly erroneous’ standard of review is applicable to 
the Circuit Court’s finding that the search of the ECU was ‘a reasona-
ble search under § 8-201 of Maryland’s Criminal Procedure Ar-
ticle.’”153
The Court of Appeals determined that it was “reasonable to con-
clude that the evidence . . . was handled in conformity with the rou-
tine practice of the Circuit Court and the Police Department.”
   
154
 
 148. Id. at 21–24. 
  The 
court reviewed testimony given by Lieutenant Colonel Michael And-
rew, the commanding officer of the ECU, in which he explained the 
procedures for searching for requested evidence and remarked that 
thousands of pieces of evidence in the ECU were destroyed in 2003 by 
 149. May 17, 2010 Court Order in the Cir. Ct. for Balt. City, Ex. 26, Blake II, 418 Md. 
445, 15 A.3d 787 (No. 58).  The affidavits from Mercy Hospital employees indicated that 
the hospital did not have any formal evidence collection or destruction policies for evi-
dence in rape cases at the time of Mr. Blake’s trial.  Apr. 19, 2010 Affidavit of Dr. Charles 
Shubin, Ex. 21, Blake II, 418 Md. 445, 15 A.3d 787 (No. 58);  Apr. 15, 2010 Affidavit of De-
bra Holbrook, Ex. 19, Blake II, 418 Md. 445, 15 A.3d 787 (No. 58).  The affidavit from the 
Forensic Investigations Unit indicated that none of the requested evidence was discovered 
in the State’s Attorney’s Office.  Apr. 19, 2010 Affidavit of Sharon Holback, Ex. 23, Blake II, 
418 Md. 445, 15 A.3d 787 (No. 58).  
 150. Blake II, 418 Md. at 450–51, 15 A.3d at 790–91. 
 151. Id. at 451–52, 15 A.3d at 791. 
 152. Id. at 447, 451, 15 A.3d at 788, 791. 
 153. Id. at 460, 15 A.3d at 796 (emphasis added). 
 154. Id. 
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a flood from Hurricane Isabel.155  Furthermore, the court accepted a 
tape recorded statement from the attorney who prosecuted Mr. Blake 
as proof that the State’s Attorney’s Office did not take possession of 
the requested evidence after Mr. Blake’s trial.156  According to the 
court, the prosecutor’s statement indicated that at the end of the trial 
the evidence could not have gone anywhere except the ECU, and the 
testimony of Sergeant Bazzle, the officer who oversaw the search of 
the ECU, indicated that the search was reasonable.157  The Court of 
Appeals concluded that the circuit court did not err in determining 
that the search for DNA evidence was reasonable and, therefore, af-
firmed the denial of Mr. Blake’s request for additional searches.158
With the numerous advancements in DNA testing technology, 
access to post-conviction DNA testing has garnered increasing atten-
tion from the federal and state governments.
  
159  The enactment of 
Section 8-201 and the subsequent amendments to the statute demon-
strate that the Maryland General Assembly has sought to provide peti-
tioners with greater post-conviction remedies through DNA testing.160  
Similarly, the case law of the Court of Appeals of Maryland indicates 
that the court appreciates the significance of post-conviction DNA 
testing cases.161  The Blake II decision to implement a clearly errone-
ous standard of review, however, deviated from this trajectory.162  The 
court’s most recent post-conviction DNA testing case, Washington v. 
State, which reaffirmed the clearly erroneous standard of review,163
 
 155. See id. at 452–54, 15 A.3d at 792–93 (repeating excerpts from Lieutenant Colonel 
Andrew’s testimony in which he stated that the police department hired an outside com-
pany to inventory the evidence in the ECU and hired another company after Hurricane 
Isabel to identify and “dry out the evidence and relocate it to an off-site warehouse”).  Ser-
geant Larry Bazzle, the officer who supervised the search for evidence in Mr. Blake’s case, 
testified that he searched for a 56 form, which documents when property arrives at the 
ECU, looked in the green card file, which the BCPD used in the past to document proper-
ty numbers and locations for evidence, and took thirty pre-hire officers from the police 
department to the offsite facility to search for the property numbers in Mr. Blake’s case.  
Id. at 455–58, 15 A.3d at 793–95 (citations omitted).  None of the searches recovered the 
evidence Mr. Blake requested.  Id. 
 
suggests that this deviation from the petitioner-friendly approach  of 
the prior cases creates a new—and troubling—precedent for the 
Court of Appeals.  
 156. Id. at 461–62, 15 A.3d at 797. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 462, 15 A.3d at 797. 
 159. See supra Part I.A. 
 160. See supra Part I.B. 
 161. See supra Part I.C.1–2. 
 162. See supra Part I.C.3. 
 163. See supra notes 105–111 and accompanying text. 
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II.  ANALYSIS 
The “clearly erroneous” standard of review of a post-conviction 
trial court’s decision that the State conducted a reasonable search for 
DNA evidence, announced by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in 
Blake II and reaffirmed in Washington v. State, is problematic for three 
reasons.  First, the standard is inconsistent with the legislative intent 
behind Section 8-201 of facilitating the exoneration of innocent indi-
viduals through post-conviction DNA testing.164  Second, application 
of the standard is a departure from the petitioner-friendly line of cas-
es developed by the Court of Appeals in nine of its other Section 8-
201 decisions and creates a significant barrier that prevents petition-
ers from obtaining their requested relief.165  And third, a clearly erro-
neous standard does not provide for sufficiently meaningful review in 
post-conviction DNA testing cases, which present issues too serious to 
be subject to a highly deferential standard from a reviewing court.166  
The Court of Appeals should have adopted a more exacting standard 
for reviewing a finding that the State’s search for potentially exculpa-
tory DNA evidence was reasonable.  The standards implemented by 
the high courts of other states, namely the bifurcated standard of re-
view in Texas, demonstrate how the Court of Appeals could have pro-
vided relief to petitioners while giving deference to the decisions of 
trial courts.167
A.  The Decision to Apply a “Clearly Erroneous” Standard of Review Is 
Inconsistent with the Intent of the Maryland General Assembly in 
Enacting Section 8-201 
    
A clearly erroneous standard of review of a post-conviction 
court’s finding that the State conducted a reasonable search for DNA 
evidence will frustrate the legislative intent behind Section 8-201.  In 
enacting Section 8-201, the Maryland General Assembly intended to 
provide imprisoned individuals who are actually innocent with a re-
medy through post-conviction DNA testing.168
 
 164. See infra Part II.A. 
  The various amend-
 165. See infra Part II.B. 
 166. See infra Part II.C. 
 167. See infra Part II.D. 
 168. See Gregg v. State, 409 Md. 698, 715, 976 A.2d 999, 1008–09 (2009) (noting that the 
“purpose [of Section 8-201] is to provide a remedy for persons convicted of serious crimes 
of which they are actually innocent”); Thompson I, 395 Md. 240, 251, 909 A.2d 1035, 1042 
(2006) (holding that Section 8-201 “manifests a legislative intent in favor of DNA testing of 
potentially exculpatory physical evidence”).  But see Gregg, 409 Md. at 712, n.8, 976 A.2d at 
1007 n.8 (“We have examined the bill files of both S.B. 363 and H.B. 575, and found noth-
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ments to Section 8-201, specifically the direct appeal provision, sup-
port the claim that the General Assembly intended the remedies 
available under Section 8-201 to apply broadly, and they stand in stark 
contrast to the Court of Appeals’ decision in Blake II to implement a 
narrow standard of review. 
With each set of amendments, the General Assembly has ex-
panded petitioners’ access to post-conviction DNA testing, and, as a 
result, developed “one of the nation’s most far-reaching” access to 
DNA testing statutes.169  In 2003, the General Assembly reduced the 
requirements that petitioners must meet to establish their entitlement 
to DNA testing under Section 8-201 and added the provision allowing 
for a direct appeal to the Court of Appeals.170  The Maryland Com-
mission on Capital Punishment (“Maryland Commission”), a body 
created by the General Assembly for a six-month period to study ap-
plication of the death penalty in Maryland and make recommenda-
tions to the General Assembly,171 reported that “[i]n a nutshell, the 
[2008] amendments broaden the universe of persons from whom 
DNA samples must be collected and expand post-conviction access to 
collected DNA evidence.”172  The 2008 amendments applied the di-
rect appeal provision to any order entered under Section 8-201, in ad-
dition to allowing petitioners to file a motion for new trial if the State 
cannot produce the requested DNA evidence.173
 
ing in either file that informs the legislative purpose behind the amendment to § 8-
201(c).”).     
  Indeed, the General 
Assembly specifically intended for Section 8-201 to have its broadest 
possible effect during the five-year window from 2009 to 2013.  This is 
 169. Rodricks, supra note 5, at 25A; see also supra text accompanying notes 46–59. 
 170. See supra text accompanying notes 47–53, 62–63; see also Gregg, 409 Md. at 715–16, 
976 A.2d at 1009 (“The General Assembly, moreover, did not express an intent to have the 
2003 amendment to § 8-201(c) apply only to persons convicted on or after its effective 
date.”). 
 171. MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. § 3-910 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008), abrogated by Acts 
2008, ch. 430, § 3 (effective Dec. 31, 2008). 
 172. MD. COMM’N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, FINAL REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
90 (2008), available at http://www.goccp.maryland.gov/capital-punishment/documents/ 
death-penalty-commission-final-report.pdf.  The Maryland Commission “commended [the 
General Assembly] for encouraging the use of DNA technology fairly and judiciously in 
criminal cases through its recent enactment of various amendments to Maryland’s DNA 
laws.”  Id. 
 173. § 8-201(c), (k)(6) (2009); see supra text accompanying notes 54–59, 63–64; see also 
Justin Brooks & Alexander Simpson, Blood Sugar Sex Magik: A Review of Postconviction DNA 
Testing Statutes and Legislative Recommendations, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 799, 850 (2011) (“Very few 
states impose any meaningful remedy to the defendant if evidence is destroyed. Maryland's 
statute provides a meaningful remedy, but the remedy is limited to instances in which the 
‘failure to produce evidence was the result of intentional and willful destruction.’” (cita-
tion omitted)). 
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clear from the fact that the remedies introduced by the 2008 amend-
ments will be abrogated on December 13, 2013.174  The General As-
sembly’s goal, however, will be stymied by the Court of Appeals’ deci-
sion to use the highly deferential clearly erroneous standard of 
review.175
Further proof of how the Blake II clearly erroneous standard of 
review abandoned the legislative intent behind Section 8-201 is that 
cases only move directly to the Court of Appeals in a limited number 
of circumstances.  The cases that move directly to the Court of Ap-
peals do so in one of two ways: (1) through a direct appeal or (2) 
through the original or exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of 
Appeals.
 
176  These cases involve such consequential proceedings as 
sentences of death, uniform certification of legal questions, legislative 
redistricting, and contested elections.177
The General Assembly added appeals from orders entered under 
Section 8-201 to this list in 2003.
   
178  Notably, the General Assembly 
did not place a direct appeal provision in the Uniform Postconviction 
Procedure Act (“UPPA”), so an aggrieved party that wishes to appeal a 
decision entered under the UPPA must “apply to the Court of Special 
Appeals for leave to appeal the order.”179  That the General Assembly 
deliberately chose to bypass the discretionary certiorari process for 
appeals under Section 8-201, but not for appeals implemented under 
the UPPA and Maryland Rule 4-331,180
Furthermore, the instances in which the General Assembly has 
authorized direct access to the Court of Appeals involve what the leg-
 speaks to the clear legislative 
intent to treat appeals in post-conviction DNA testing cases differently 
from all other post-conviction proceedings.   
 
 174. See supra text accompanying notes 54–59. 
 175. The Court of Appeals’ decision to apply a clearly erroneous standard has already 
had a negative effect on petitioners’ ability to obtain relief through post-conviction DNA 
testing during this five-year period.  For example, on February 21, 2012, in Washington v. 
State, 424 Md. 632, 37 A.3d 932 (2012), the court affirmed the post-conviction trial court’s 
denial of Mr. Washington-Bey’s Section 8-201 petition on the grounds that the State con-
ducted a reasonable search for the requested DNA evidence.  See supra notes 105–111 and 
accompanying text.  
 176. See supra text accompanying notes 68–76. 
 177. See supra text accompanying notes 68–76.  
 178. See supra text accompanying note 62. 
 179. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 7-109(a) (LexisNexis 2008); see supra note 71. 
 180. See Gregg v. State, 409 Md. 698, 707, 976 A.2d 999, 1004 (2009) (“The State argues 
that, unlike the court’s denial of Appellant’s requested relief under § 8-201, which is sub-
ject to direct review by this Court, the court’s denial of relief under Rule 4-331 can reach 
us only by issuance of a writ of certiorari.  Appellant, at oral argument before us, agreed 
with the State.  So do we.”). 
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islature has determined to be the most important issues—issues that 
require more than a highly deferential clearly erroneous standard of 
review.  For example, the Court of Appeals can overturn the results of 
an election when there is “some hard evidence that the votes would 
have been cast in a particular manner.”181  In addition, the General 
Assembly has prescribed specific procedures for how the Court of 
Appeals is to review death penalty cases, which are automatically re-
viewed in the Court of Appeals.  The court must determine whether 
“the imposition of the death sentence was influenced by passion, pre-
judice, or any other arbitrary factor” and whether “the evidence sup-
ports a finding by the court or jury that the aggravating circumstances 
outweigh the mitigating circumstances.”182
The General Assembly’s decision to provide for such limited di-
rect access to the Court of Appeals necessarily implies that the court 
should review the decisions of post-conviction courts regarding the 
reasonableness of a search for DNA evidence under a less deferential 
standard than clear error.  Given the expansive nature of the reme-
dies available under Section 8-201, the Court of Appeals’ decision to 
review a post-conviction trial court’s finding that the State conducted 
a reasonable search for DNA evidence under a clearly erroneous 
standard is undoubtedly inconsistent with the legislative intent behind 
the statute. 
   
B.  The “Clearly Erroneous” Standard of Review Announced in Blake II 
Deviated from the Court of Appeals’ Decisions in Nine of Its Other 
Post-Conviction DNA Testing Cases  
The Blake II decision to implement a clearly erroneous standard 
of review for determinations of the reasonableness of the State’s 
search for potentially exculpatory DNA evidence deviated from the 
Court of Appeals’ earlier Section 8-201 cases.  Blake II’s clearly erro-
neous standard relied on reasoning that is inconsistent with the 
court’s earlier Section 8-201 jurisprudence and created a troubling 
precedent for access to relief in future petitions.183
Prior to Blake II, the Court of Appeals developed an increasingly 
petitioner-friendly jurisprudence regarding the remedies available 
    
 
 181. Suessmann v. Lamone, 383 Md. 697, 717, 862 A.2d 1, 12 (2004).  It is important to 
note that “a probability of 51%, of ‘more likely than not’ or ‘reasonable likelihood,’ will 
not suffice to overturn an election result and institute new elections.”  Id. at 718, 862 A.2d 
at 13.   
 182. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-401(d)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011). 
 183. See supra notes 105–111 and accompanying text. 
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under Section 8-201.184  Although Blake II is a “search for evidence” 
case, an examination of both “search for evidence” and “evidence in 
hand” cases is appropriate because it demonstrates the extent to 
which Blake II deviated from this petitioner-friendly line of Section 8-
201 cases.  The Court of Appeals issued decisions in favor of the peti-
tioners, either reversing or vacating the post-conviction trial courts’ 
decisions and remanding the cases back to the circuit courts, in each 
of the three “search for evidence” and five “evidence in hand” cases 
that it decided before Blake II.185  In announcing and applying the 
clearly erroneous standard of review in Blake II, the Court of Appeals, 
for the first time, affirmed a post-conviction court’s dismissal of a Sec-
tion 8-201 petition and denied a petitioner relief under Section 8-
201.186  That the Court of Appeals subsequently granted relief to the 
petitioner in Arey II, a “search for evidence” case that did not turn on 
the reasonableness of the State’s search for DNA evidence,187 while 
denying relief in Washington based on an application of the clearly er-
roneous standard of review,188
The Blake II decision to implement a clearly erroneous standard 
of review, in addition to producing an outcome that is inconsistent 
with those in the prior Section 8-201 cases, also deviated from the line 
of reasoning that the Court of Appeals used to analyze its eight earlier 
Section 8-201 cases.  For example, the clearly erroneous standard for 
reviewing a post-conviction court’s finding that the State conducted a 
reasonable search for DNA evidence is a sharp contrast from what the 
 demonstrates that the decision in Blake 
II to implement a clearly erroneous standard of review has shifted the 
course of Maryland’s post-conviction DNA testing jurisprudence away 
from the previously petitioner-friendly approach taken by the Court 
of Appeals.    
 
 184. See supra Part I.C.1–2. 
 185. See supra Part I.C.1–2.   
 186. See supra Part I.C.3.b. 
 187. See supra notes 102–104 and accompanying text.  Although Arey II was a “search for 
evidence” case, the Court of Appeals opted to remand the case based on a finding that the 
circuit court prematurely denied the Section 8-201 petition.  See supra notes 102–104 and 
accompanying text.  The court distinguished the outcome in Arey II from that in Blake II by 
noting that at the final hearing on Mr. Blake’s Section 8-201 petition, counsel for Mr. 
Blake stated they would not have any further requests upon receipt of the final piece of 
information from the State, whereas counsel for Mr. Arey expressly requested additional 
opportunities to gather information.  Arey II, 422 Md. 328, 337–38, 29 A.3d 986, 991–92 
(2011).  Interestingly, “several of the hearings for [Mr. Blake and Mr. Arey] were held 
jointly.”  Id., 29 A.3d at 991.  The joint hearings included those held on February 20, 2009, 
and June 12, 2009.  June 12, 2009 Hearing Transcript, supra note 145, at 1, 3; Feb. 20, 2009 
Hearing Transcript, supra note 145, at 1, 3. 
 188. See infra notes 105–111 and accompanying text. 
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Court of Appeals previously held constituted a reasonable search.  In 
Horton v. State, the court set a very high threshold for what constitutes 
a reasonable search under Section 8-201, as delineated in Blake I and 
Arey I.189  The Horton court acknowledged that the State’s search for 
evidence was “undoubtedly” more extensive than those conducted in 
Blake I and Arey I, but determined that it fell short of meeting the 
standards set by those cases.190  The Court of Appeals’ detailed at-
tempt to analogize the requested evidence and subsequent search in 
Horton to the circumstances of Blake I and Arey I implies that the court 
used a more nuanced and less deferential standard than clear error to 
review the circuit court’s finding that the State conducted a reasona-
ble search for the DNA evidence.191
Assuming the search for DNA evidence in Horton was unreasona-
ble, as the Court of Appeals suggested, then the Blake II decision is 
even more problematic because the search in Mr. Blake’s case was 
both less extensive and less conclusive than the search in Horton.
   
192
 
 189. See supra notes 
  
93–99 and accompanying text.  It appears that when Mr. Horton 
filed his Section 8-201 petition requesting that the hospital where the victim was treated 
produce any remaining physical evidence, he relied on the advice of a student volunteer 
from the Innocence Project.  412 Md. 1, 9–10, 985 A.2d 540, 545 (2009).  The hospital 
provided an affidavit that stated it did not retain cytology slides past ten years, but the 
Court of Appeals held that the affidavit was inadequate because the retention protocol did 
not refer to the time period when the victim was treated.  Id. at 10, 16, 985 A.2d at 545, 
548–49.  Mr. Horton also requested that the State conduct a search for physical evidence; 
the State could not locate any evidence but produced two documents from the Montgom-
ery County Police Department.  Id. at 11–13, 985 A.2d at 546–47.  The first document was a 
notice from the Central Property Unit, which stated that the evidence in Mr. Horton’s case 
was approved for destruction “as of March 17, 1986.”  Id. at 12, 985 A.2d at 546.  The 
second document was a copy of a “Form 526,” which was stamped “Case Closed” and stated 
that evidence in Mr. Horton’s case had been received by the evidence unit.  Id. at 12–13, 
985 A.2d at 546–47.  The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the circuit court’s 
denial of the Section 8-201 petition, reasoning that although the documentation indicated 
that the evidence was approved for destruction, it did not prove that the destruction ac-
tually occurred.  See supra note 99.  
 190. See supra notes 93–99 and accompanying text. 
 191. See Horton, 412 Md. at 15, 985 A.2d at 548 (“The search in this case came very close 
to meeting the standards set by the Blake and Arey opinions. Nevertheless, . . . the Circuit 
Court should not have dismissed the petition.”). 
 192. Compare supra notes 144–158 and accompanying text (describing the search for 
evidence in Mr. Blake’s case), with supra note 189 (discussing the search for evidence in 
Mr. Horton’s case).  With respect to Mr. Blake’s case, a 2003 hurricane destroyed thou-
sands of pieces of evidence stored in the BCPD’s ECU, and as a result, much of the “con-
taminated or mangled evidence” no longer had identifiable property numbers.  Feb. 20, 
2009 Hearing Transcript, supra note 145, at 5–6, 31–32.  When the police officers searched 
the offsite warehouse for the requested evidence in Mr. Blake’s case, they did not know the 
specific physical evidence for which they were searching and only searched “identifiable” 
property numbers.  Id. at 16, 31–32, 45, 54.  Sergeant Bazzle, the officer who supervised 
the ECU search, confirmed that “nobody has conducted a specific search of the unmarked 
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For instance, the Horton court held that a notice from the police de-
partment, which clearly stated that the evidence in Mr. Horton’s case 
had been “approved for destruction,” was insufficient proof that the 
evidence did not exist.193  In Blake II, however, Sgt. Bazzle testified 
that he could not even locate an evidence destruction authorization 
form, but the Court of Appeals still affirmed the lower court’s finding 
that the search was reasonable.194
Blake II was the Court of Appeals’ first pronouncement of the 
clearly erroneous standard of review and the first Section 8-201 deci-
sion to deny relief to a petitioner.  The decision signaled a change in 
the court’s willingness to grant petitioners access to post-conviction 
DNA testing.  Indeed, he court relied on Blake II eleven months later 
in Washington to once again deny relief to a petitioner by applying the 
clearly erroneous standard of review.  Unfortunately, Blake II was 
based on a line of reasoning that deviated from the court’s previous 
analyses of what constituted a reasonable search for DNA evidence.  
This provides strong support for the assertion that the clearly errone-
ous standard of review is both inconsistent with the Court of Appeals’ 
past Section 8-201 jurisprudence and troubling for its future.
   
195
 
evidence.”  Id. at 45–46.  Thus, there is presumably a mass of unmarked evidence in the 
ECU’s offsite storage unit that has not been searched merely because the evidence does 
not have readable property identification numbers.  Id. at 45–48. 
  
 193. See supra note 189. 
 194. See supra note 155. 
 195. It is important to note that in Arrington, the Court of Appeals quoted its holding in 
Wilson v. State and noted that it “‘[does] not disturb the factual findings of the post-
conviction court unless they are clearly erroneous.’”  411 Md. 524, 551, 983 A.2d 1071, 
1086 (2009) (quoting Wilson v. State, 363 Md. 333, 348, 768 A.2d 675, 683 (2001)).  The 
Arrington court also acknowledged, however, that while “factual determinations of the post-
conviction court [are reviewed] under a clearly erroneous standard, [the Court of Ap-
peals] make[s] an independent determination of relevant law and its application to the 
facts.”  Id., 983 A.2d at 1086–87 (citation omitted).  In addition, Arrington involved a com-
plex discussion of a Section 8-201 petition, a motion under Maryland Rule 4-331 for a new 
trial in light of newly discovered DNA evidence, and various claims under the UPPA.  Id. at 
536–50, 983 A.2d at 1078–86.  Wilson, however, was a pure UPPA case decided in March, 
2001, almost seven months before Section 8-201 took effect.  Wilson, 363 Md. at 337, 768 
A.2d at 677.  The Wilson court’s holding that factual findings in post-conviction cases are 
subject to a clearly erroneous standard of review, as confirmed by the Arrington court, 
should not be read to infer support for the Court of Appeals’ clearly erroneous standard 
in Blake II because the UPPA, on which the Wilson standard of review was based, was not at 
issue in Blake II.  Furthermore, there was a clear legislative intent to treat Section 8-201 dif-
ferently from the UPPA, which suggests that the standard of review deemed appropriate 
for the UPPA is not necessarily the standard that is appropriate under Section 8-201.  See 
supra text accompanying notes 178–180 and accompanying text.   
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C.  Post-Conviction DNA Testing Cases Involve Issues That Are Too 
Serious to be Subject to the Highly Deferential Clearly Erroneous 
Standard of Review 
Finally, the Court of Appeals of Maryland erred in applying a 
clearly erroneous standard of review to a post-conviction court’s rea-
sonableness findings because DNA testing cases highlight crucial is-
sues of criminal justice that warrant a less deferential standard of re-
view.  Advancements in DNA testing technology have resulted in not 
only greater certainty in prosecutions and convictions, but also in a 
significant number of exonerations.  The emergence of exonerations 
has exposed flaws in the criminal justice system, which provides a 
compelling argument for the inappropriateness of a clearly erroneous 
standard of review. 
Post-conviction DNA testing has resulted in substantial benefits 
both for the prosecution, in the form of more definitive convictions, 
and for the wrongfully convicted, in the form of exonerations.196  
Throughout the United States, “[f]rom the Supreme Court down, 
appellate courts have been mindful of the persuasive power of DNA 
evidence that inculpates or exculpates defendants from criminal activ-
ity.”197  In the United States, post-conviction DNA testing statutes and 
various judicial procedures have resulted in 289 exonerations.198  The 
first exoneration occurred in 1989, and since 2000, 222 more individ-
uals have been exonerated.199  On average, the exonerees served thir-
teen years in prison before being released.200  In addition to validating 
convictions and producing exonerations, DNA testing has also identi-
fied the true perpetrators of many crimes.201
 
 196. See Dist. Attorney’s Office for Third Jud. Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 129 S. Ct. 
2308, 2316 (2009) (“DNA testing has exonerated wrongly convicted people, and has con-
firmed the convictions of many others.”).  For instance, DNA tests have “‘matched’ or in-
cluded the primary suspect” in roughly 6,000 out of 10,000 sexual assault cases since 1989.  
Peter Neufeld & Barry C. Scheck, Foreword: Commentaries on DNA Testing to EDWARD 
CONNORS ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: 
CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL, at 
xxviii (1996), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/dnaevid.pdf.   
  A study conducted by 
 197. Thompson II, 411 Md. 664, 686, 985 A.2d 32, 44 (2009).   
 198. Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.inno-
cenceproject.org/Content/Facts_on_PostConviction_DNA_Exonerations.php (last visited 
Feb. 11, 2012).   
 199. Id. 
 200. Innocence Project Case Profiles, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject. 
org/know/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2012). 
 201. See, e.g., Susan Levine, Ex-Death Row Inmate Hears Hoped-for Words: We Found Killer, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2003, at A1 (reporting on Mr. Bloodsworth’s case and writing that in 
2003, “[i]n a plot twist few involved could have imagined,” Dawn Hamilton’s killer, a man 
who Mr. Bloodsworth knew from the time he spent in prison for the crimes, was identified 
  
2012] ACCESS TO POST-CONVICTION DNA TESTING 919 
members of the Innocence Network, “a group of affiliated organiza-
tions taking on claims of innocence from prisoners,”202 examined 194 
exonerations and found that the true perpetrators had been 
identified in 44 percent of the cases.203
The exonerations and subsequent “true perpetrator” identifica-
tions that have occurred as a result of DNA testing are noteworthy on 
their own, but they have also exposed several flaws in the criminal jus-
tice system, including false confessions and the unreliability of eyewit-
ness identifications.
  
204  For instance, “[f]alse confessions and incrimi-
nating statements lead to wrongful convictions in approximately 
twenty-five percent of cases.”205  It is also widely accepted that “[t]he 
overwhelming number of convictions of the innocent involve[s] eye-
witness identification.”206 The number of wrongful convictions based 
on eyewitness misidentification is around 75 percent.207
 
using DNA evidence obtained from a semen stain on underwear and “entered into state 
and federal DNA databases, . . . the same kind of evidence that in 1993 led to Bloods-
worth’s exoneration after almost nine years of incarceration”). 
  This figure is 
 202. Greg Hampikian, Emily West & Olga Akselrod, The Genetics of Innocence: Analysis of 
194 U.S. DNA Exonerations, 12 ANN. REV. GENOMICS & HUM. GENETICS 97, 100 (2011).   
 203. Id. at 103 (noting that the true perpetrators were identified in 85 of the 194 cases).  
The authors noted that “intimate swab evidence,” including “oral, anal, and vaginal swabs,” 
contributed to exonerations in 126 of the 194 exonerations.  Id. at 110–11.  In addition, 
“[c]lothing evidence provided exclusionary results in approximately half of these cases 
[102 of 194].”  Id.  These two types of evidence, which are “the most common . . . in proba-
tive exclusions,” were among the evidence that Mr. Blake requested in his Section 8-201 
petition.  Id. at 110; see supra notes 132–135 and accompanying text.    
 204. See, e.g., Rago, supra note 2, at 857–68 (discussing how five eyewitnesses identified 
Kirk Bloodsworth as the man who raped and murdered Dawn Hamilton, leading twice to 
his conviction, before Mr. Bloodsworth was exonerated by DNA testing); see also Simmon-
sen, supra note 3, at 1076 (positing that “fears about wrongful convictions based on inac-
curate eyewitness testimony remain a pressing concern warranting action by the legal sys-
tem”). 
 205. Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, supra note 198; see also Hampikian, supra 
note 202, at 103–04 (reporting that among “[t]he known factors that contributed to these 
194 wrongful convictions [are] guilty pleas and/or confessions or admissions of involve-
ment in the crimes by exonerees (30% [57 of 194])”).  A discussion of false confessions 
factored into the Court of Appeals’ decision in Thompson II.  See supra note 122 and ac-
companying text.  For an in-depth discussion of the connection between false confessions 
and exonerations, see Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 88–91 
(2008). 
 206. Garrett, supra note 205, at 78.   
 207. See Hampikian, supra note 202, at 103 (finding that 145 of 194 exonerees were con-
victed through misidentification); see also Garrett, supra note 205, at 78 (studying 200 ex-
onerations and finding that identification testimony led to the wrongful convictions in 
“158 of 200 cases (79%)”). 
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even higher when looking at the number of misidentifications result-
ing from victim testimony.208
Courts are well attuned to the important role that post-conviction 
DNA testing plays in producing exonerations, particularly when eye-
witness identifications lead to the initial conviction.
   
209  In fact, courts 
often rely on studies like those conducted by the Innocence Network 
when citing statistical information concerning post-conviction DNA 
testing.210
D.  The Court of Appeals Should Have Adopted a More Exacting 
Standard for Reviewing a Post-Conviction Court’s Finding That the 
State Conducted a Reasonable Search Under Section 8-201 
  These studies and the courts’ awareness of the issues they 
reveal make it even more surprising that the Court of Appeals 
adopted a clearly erroneous standard of review for a post-conviction 
trial court’s finding that the State conducted a reasonable search for 
potentially exculpatory DNA evidence.  The shocking nature of these 
statistics strongly suggests that a highly deferential standard is inap-
propriate for reviewing trial court findings in post-conviction DNA 
testing cases. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland could have avoided the prob-
lematic situation created by the adoption of a clearly erroneous stan-
dard of review in Blake II by implementing a more exacting standard, 
such as the one adopted by the Supreme Court of Illinois or by the 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.  The significant number of exone-
rations in Illinois and Texas through post-conviction DNA testing 
suggests that these states have developed standards of review that bet-
ter achieve the intent behind post-conviction DNA access statutes.  An 
examination of the standards of review implemented in these states 
indicates that the bifurcated standard adopted by the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals is a more effective solution because it achieves the 
goal of providing post-conviction relief, while also giving deference to 
the decisions of post-conviction trial courts.  
 
 208. See Hampikian, supra note 202, at 103 (finding that 126 of the 145 exonerees who 
were convicted through misidentification, or 85 percent, were misidentified by the victim). 
 209. See United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131, 141–42 (3d Cir. 2006) (“The recent 
availability of post-conviction DNA tests demonstrate [sic] that there have been an over-
whelming number of false convictions stemming from uninformed reliance on eyewitness 
misidentifications.”). 
 210. See, e.g., id. at 142 (“[E]yewitness evidence presented from well-meaning and confi-
dent citizens is highly persuasive but, at the same time, is among the least reliable forms of evi-
dence.” (citation omitted)); Thompson I, 395 Md. 240, 252, 909 A.2d 1035, 1043 (2006) (cit-
ing Innocence Project statistics quoted in a Maryland Senate bill in support of post-
conviction DNA testing). 
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Like Maryland, Illinois has an interesting connection to post-
conviction DNA testing.  In 1989, Gary Dotson was the first person in 
the United States to be exonerated through DNA testing, after serving 
ten years in an Illinois prison.211  Just under a decade later, the Illinois 
General Assembly enacted the state’s DNA access statute, which took 
effect on January 1, 1998.212  The Illinois statute is similar to Mary-
land’s Section 8-201 to the extent that a trial court in Illinois grants a 
petitioner’s motion for post-conviction DNA testing when: “(1) the 
result of the testing has the scientific potential to produce . . . mate-
rially relevant” evidence; and “(2) the testing requested employs a 
scientific method generally accepted within the relevant scientific 
community.”213  Appellate courts in Illinois, however, apply a de novo 
standard of review to denials of motions for DNA testing.214  Illinois 
courts have reasoned that the “[de novo] standard is appropriate be-
cause the trial court’s decision . . . is necessarily based upon its review 
of the pleadings and the trial transcripts and is not based upon its as-
sessment of the credibility of the witnesses.”215
The adoption of the Illinois standard of review is not ideal for 
Maryland, however, because a de novo review can be problematic.  
Specifically, it is not always the case that a post-conviction trial court’s 
decision is based solely on a paper record.
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 211. Garrett, supra note 
  In these situations, a de 
novo standard of review can lead to confusion as to the appropriate 
205, at 63; Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United 
States, 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 523 (2005).  In total, forty-
one individuals have been exonerated in Illinois through post-conviction DNA testing.  
Exonerations by State, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/news/State-
View.php (last visited Feb. 11, 2012). 
 212. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-3 (West 2008). 
 213. Id. 5/116-3(c).  Despite these similarities, there are significant differences between 
the two statutes.  For example, the Illinois statute requires that “the result of the testing 
has the scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence materially relevant to 
the defendant’s assertion of actual innocence even though the results may not completely ex-
onerate the defendant.”  Id. 5/116-3(c)(1) (emphasis added).  Section 8-201, however, re-
quires “a reasonable probability . . . that the DNA testing has the scientific potential to pro-
duce exculpatory or mitigating evidence relevant to a claim of wrongful conviction or 
sentencing.”  § 8-201(d)(1)(i) (2009) (emphasis added).  In addition, the Illinois statute 
“requires a defendant who seeks DNA testing to present a prima facie case that ‘identity was 
the issue’ in the trial that led to his conviction.”  People v. Hockenberry, 737 N.E.2d 1088, 
1091 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (citation omitted). 
 214. People v. O’Connell, 879 N.E.2d 315, 317 (Ill. 2007). 
 215. Hockenberry, 737 N.E.2d at 1091. 
 216. See, e.g., Blake II, 418 Md. 445, 450, 15 A.3d 787, 790 (2011) (noting that “[t]o re-
solve the issue of whether the State satisfied its ultimate burden of persuasion, the Circuit 
Court held four hearings, during which it received testimony, documentary evidence, affi-
davits, and proffered information” (footnote omitted)).   
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standard for reviewing decisions entered under a state’s post-
conviction DNA testing statute.217
The standard of review applied in Texas provides a more effec-
tive solution to the problem posed by the clearly erroneous standard 
of review announced in Blake II.  On April 5, 2001, the Texas Legisla-
ture enacted Chapter 64 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 
(“Chapter 64”), which allows “[a] convicted person [to] submit . . . a 
motion for forensic DNA testing of evidence containing biological 
material.”
   
218  Both before and after the enactment of Chapter 64, for-
ty-four individuals have been exonerated through post-conviction 
DNA testing in Texas, more than in any other state.219  Although the 
number of exonerations is noteworthy, far exceeding the number of 
exonerations in Maryland,220 Chapter 64 is a fairly restrictive statute.  
For instance, a Chapter 64 petition to test DNA evidence “must be ac-
companied by an affidavit, sworn to by the convicted person, contain-
ing statements of fact in support of the motion.”221  In addition, ap-
peals from orders entered under Chapter 64 proceed “in the same 
manner as an appeal of any other criminal matter.”222
Despite the restrictive nature of Chapter 64, the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals has adopted a standard of review that both provides 
for exonerations, in accordance with the intent of the Texas Legisla-
   
 
 217. Compare People v. Shum, 797 N.E.2d 609, 620 (Ill. 2003) (“We review de novo the 
dismissal of a postconviction claim without an evidentiary hearing[, but w]e also review de 
novo the ruling denying a section 116-3 motion.” (citations omitted)), with People v. Slov-
er, 959 N.E.2d 72, 75 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (“The present case is distinguishable from pre-
vious cases applying section 116-3 in that the trial court heard testimony on defendants’ 
motion and based its ruling, in part, on its assessment of the witnesses’ credibility. We 
therefore agree . . . that de novo review is inappropriate in this case.”). 
 218. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.01–.05 (West 2006 & Supp. 2011). 
 219. See Exonerations by State, supra note 211 (providing an interactive map with the 
number of exonerations in each of the fifty states and the District of Columbia). 
 220. See Maryland: Exonerations by State, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocence-
project.org/news/state.php?state=md (last visited April 13, 2012) (noting that three indi-
viduals from Maryland, including Mr. Bloodsworth, have been exonerated through post-
conviction DNA testing).   
 221. CRIM. PROC. art. 64.01(a-1).  Under Chapter 64, a court may only order DNA test-
ing if it finds that: (1) the evidence “still exists and is in a condition making DNA testing 
possible;” (2) the evidence “has been subjected to a chain of custody sufficient to establish 
that it has not been . . . altered in any material respect;” (3) “identity was or is an issue in 
the case;” (4) the petitioner “establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that [he] 
would not have been convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA 
testing;” and (5) the petitioner “establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that . . . 
the request for the proposed DNA testing is not made to unreasonably delay the execution 
of sentence or administration of justice.”  Id. art. 64.03(a).   
 222. Id. art. 64.05.  A petitioner only receives a direct appeal to the Texas Court of Crim-
inal Appeals under Chapter 64 when the original conviction included a sentence of death.  
Id.   
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ture, and gives deference to the decisions of lower courts.  Appellate 
courts in Texas “apply a bifurcated standard of review to determine 
whether the trial court properly denied an appellant’s request for 
post-conviction DNA testing.”223  In applying the bifurcated standard 
of review, appellate courts “afford almost total deference to a trial 
court’s determination of issues of historical fact and application-of-
law-to-fact issues that turn on credibility and demeanor, [but] review 
de novo other application-of-law-to-fact issues.”224  Thus, a trial court’s 
determination that evidence was destroyed is accorded deference by 
an appellate court, while a finding that the petitioner did not estab-
lish by a preponderance of the evidence that the jury would not have 
convicted at trial if it had access to the exculpatory DNA test results is 
reviewed de novo.225
In Blake II, the Court of Appeals of Maryland should have 
adopted a standard other than clear error to review a trial court’s 
finding that the State conducted a reasonable search for DNA evi-
dence.  Illinois and Texas, having produced the most exonerations 
through post-conviction DNA testing,
   
226 provide examples of different 
standards of review that the Court of Appeals should have considered.  
The bifurcated standard of review adopted by the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals is a more effective standard for appeals in post-
conviction DNA testing cases because it allows appellate courts to 
carefully examine statutory and legal requirements and ensures that 
purely factual determinations remain with lower courts.  Thus, the bi-
furcated standard enables exonerations, which is the intent behind 
DNA access statutes, while making sure that the factual findings of tri-
al courts receive deference.227
 
 223. Hooks v. State, 203 S.W.3d 861, 863 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (emphasis added) (cit-
ing Rivera v. State, 89 S.W.3d 55, 59 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). 
 
 224. Rivera, 89 S.W.3d at 59. 
 225. See Routier v. State, 273 S.W.3d 241, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (noting that the 
petitioner must “establish by a preponderance of the evidence that, assuming those [DNA] 
tests produce exculpatory evidence, the jury would not have convicted . . . in light of this 
additional, exculpatory evidence, [which] is an issue [the court] always review[s] de novo” 
(footnote omitted)); Figueroa v. State, No. 2-03-064-CR, 2003 WL 22674767, at *1 (Tex. 
App. Nov. 13, 2003) (“The trial court found that evidence possibly containing biological 
material had been destroyed. Deferring to this finding of historical fact, we conclude the 
trial court did not err in refusing to order DNA testing.”). 
 226. Exonerations by State, supra note 211. 
 227. Furthermore, if the Court of Appeals of Maryland had applied the bifurcated stan-
dard of review in Blake II, it is possible that the court would have reached a different out-
come.  The bifurcated standard involves de novo review of application-of-law-to-fact issues 
that do not involve credibility or demeanor.  As a result, the Blake II court very well may 
have found upon application of the law—that the State must conduct a reasonable search 
for DNA evidence—to the facts of Mr. Blake’s case—that, as per Sergeant Bazzle’s testi-
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III.  CONCLUSION 
At first glance, the cases from the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
that address Section 8-201 petitions for post-conviction DNA testing 
appear to form a petitioner-friendly set of decisions.228  Although the 
Court of Appeals has granted relief to petitioners in nine of its eleven 
Section 8-201 decisions by reversing denials of motions for DNA test-
ing,229 the ramifications of Blake II, the court’s first denial of relief, will 
reach far beyond the circumstances of that particular case, as demon-
strated by the court’s reliance on Blake II in Washington v. State, which 
resulted in the court’s second denial of a Section 8-201 petition.230
The decision in Blake II to apply a clearly erroneous standard of 
review to a post-conviction trial court’s finding that the State con-
ducted a reasonable search for potentially exculpatory DNA evidence 
is problematic on three levels.  A clearly erroneous standard of review 
is inconsistent with the intent of the Maryland General Assembly in 
enacting Section 8-201.
 
231  Furthermore, Blake II deviated from the 
Court of Appeals’ prior course of action in granting relief to petition-
ers in Section 8-201 cases and set the stage for future denials of re-
lief.232  Finally, post-conviction DNA testing cases involve serious issues 
for which a clearly erroneous standard of review is inappropriate.233  
The bifurcated standard of review implemented by the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals provides an example of how the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland could have adopted a more exacting standard that would 
provide petitioners with relief through post-conviction DNA testing 
and continue to give deference to the decisions of post-conviction tri-
al courts.234
 
mony, the police only examined evidence that had readable property numbers—that the 
State’s search for evidence was not reasonable based on the fact that the police did not 
search an entire mass of evidence merely because the property numbers were not com-
pletely identifiable.    
  Ultimately, the Court of Appeals’ decision in Blake II to 
apply a highly deferential standard of review to decisions on such a 
gravely important matter establishes a troubling precedent for the fu-
ture of post-conviction DNA testing in Maryland.   
 228. See supra Part I.C.1–2.  
 229. See supra Part I.C.1–2. 
 230. See supra notes 105–111 and accompanying text. 
 231. See supra Part II.A. 
 232. See supra Part II.B. 
 233. See supra Part II.C. 
 234. See supra Part II.D. 
